Over the past year, Americans have learned that many of the supposed restraints on executive branch power are defined only by norms rather than written law, and that legal action for redress is often prevented by questions of standing, sovereign immunity, narrow standards for injunctive relief, and timelines for review that can render litigation impotent in the face of a normless government willing to act pretextually. The proposed constitutional amendment does little more than restore in writing what has been implicit in the Framers’ intent and in the expectations of the American people.
The executive branch is expected to comply with the law, but what recourse does Congress have if the executive should thumb its nose at the law? Under Article I of the proposed amendment, Congress would have standing to bring civil actions to ensure compliance with appropriation laws, statutory directives and constitutional limitations on executive power.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, citizens may sue state officials who violate their rights, yet Americans may be surprised to learn that no similar right exists with respect to federal officials. Article II of this amendment would close this gap, allowing citizens to sue federal officials who violate constitutional limits or clearly established law. It doesn’t eliminate qualified immunity—officers can still defend themselves by proving their actions were authorized. It doesn’t create unlimited liability—governments may indemnify their employees. What it does is ensure that when federal officials harm you by breaking the law, you have a remedy, just as you do when state officials violate your rights. This is the accountability the Framers intended, and that most Americans assume already exists.
What do we do when a federal officer murders a citizen and the government refuses to prosecute its own officer? In Article III of this amendment, states have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute federal officers for common law crimes and violation of constitutional rights within their territory. A federal court may decide first if the conduct was lawful under federal law and within the scope of official duties. If either element is not established, the state may prosecute.
Article IV would give governors standing to challenge federalization of the National Guard, and prevent the deployment of federal National Guard units for law enforcement without the state’s consent, unless there is a constitutional violation to be remedied.
Article V allows states to use State Defense Forces to prevent unconstitutional federal action that would cause irreparable harm, protecting its citizens pending expedited judicial review of the proposed federal action.
Together, these amendment articles give various actors (Congress, the states, private citizens) the ability to defend themselves legally and physically from lawless executive action, without abandoning qualified immunity for officials or compromising the supremacy of federal law. Articles I-IV shift the burden of proof to the executive branch to demonstrate lawful authority, rendering impotent those who would thwart the law by lying shamelessly. While our Constitution to date has assumed virtuous actors, this can no longer be safely assumed, unfortunately. Just as the Civil War amendments were necessary to prevent malfeasance by state governments, so this amendment is needed to prevent disregard of the separation of powers by an amoral executive branch.
A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO RESTORE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR EXECUTIVE LAWLESSNESS
ARTICLE I: CONGRESSIONAL STANDING AND ENFORCEMENT
Section 1: Congress shall have standing to bring civil actions in federal court to enforce compliance with appropriations laws, statutory directives, and constitutional limitations on executive power. A majority vote of either chamber shall be sufficient to authorize such suits.
Section 2: Such actions shall receive expedited judicial review, with district court decisions required within 90 days and direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Courts may not dismiss such actions on grounds of political question, mootness, or lack of concrete injury.
Section 3: When Congress establishes a prima facie violation of law or constitutional limits, the burden shifts to the executive branch to demonstrate lawful authority for the challenged action.
ARTICLE II: ENFORCEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY LIMITS ON FEDERAL POWER
Section 1: No person acting under color of federal authority shall deprive any person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by this Constitution or by Acts of Congress, nor shall any such person violate clearly established statutory limitations on federal power.
Section 2: Any person injured by violation of Section 1 shall have a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, or other appropriate remedy against the responsible federal officer or employee in their individual capacity.
Section 3:
(a) In actions brought under this Article, federal officers may assert as a defense that their conduct was authorized by clearly established law at the time of the action.
(b) The burden of proving such authorization rests with the defendant officer.
(c) Good faith belief in legality shall not constitute a defense if the violation was of clearly established law that a reasonable officer would have known.
Section 4:
(a) Prevailing plaintiffs under this Article shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
(b) Courts may award fees to defendants only upon finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous or brought in bad faith.
Section 5: The United States and the several States may establish procedures for indemnification of officers held liable under this Article. The availability of indemnification shall not be a defense to liability.
Section 6: Congress shall have power to enforce this Article by appropriate legislation, including establishment of procedures, remedies, and limitations periods, but may not eliminate or substantially restrict the causes of action created hereby.
ARTICLE III: STATE PROSECUTION OF FEDERAL OFFICERS
Section 1: States retain concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute federal officers and employees for common law crimes and violations of constitutional rights committed within state territory.
Section 2: Federal officers may remove such prosecutions to federal district court solely to determine whether (a) the charged conduct was within the scope of official federal duties, and (b) the conduct was lawful under federal law. The burden of proving both elements rests with the federal officer.
Section 3: If either element is not established, the case shall be remanded to state court. If both elements are established, the case shall be dismissed, provided that federal prosecution for the same conduct is commenced within 180 days, or the state may resume prosecution.
ARTICLE IV: PROTECTION OF STATE NATIONAL GUARD
Section 1: The President may order a state’s National Guard into federal service only:
(a) With the consent of the state’s Governor; or
(b) Following authorization by majority vote of Congress; or
(c) In response to actual invasion or imminent threat to national security.
Section 2: Governors shall have standing to challenge federalization orders in federal court, with expedited review required within 72 hours. The federal government bears the burden of demonstrating that one of the conditions in Section 1 is satisfied.
Section 3: Federalized National Guard units may not be deployed for domestic law enforcement within any state without that state’s consent, except pursuant to specific congressional authorization identifying the constitutional violation being remedied, or court order following a finding of constitutional violation.
ARTICLE V: STATE DEFENSE FORCES
Section 1: States may organize, train, and maintain defense forces not subject to federal military authority, in numbers not exceeding twenty percent of their National Guard strength, for protection of state territory, institutions, and constitutional order.
Section 2: When a Governor, with approval of a constitutional majority of the state legislature, certifies that federal action within the state appears to violate the Constitution and that immediate interposition is necessary to prevent irreparable harm, state defense forces may act to prevent implementation of such federal action pending judicial review.
Section 3: Upon such interposition, the challenged federal action shall be stayed within that state. The matter shall receive expedited judicial review commencing within 72 hours in federal district court, with mandatory appeal to the Supreme Court within 30 days.
Section 4: If courts uphold the federal action, the state shall immediately comply. Continued resistance after adverse final judicial ruling shall subject state officials to federal prosecution. If courts invalidate the federal action, the federal government shall bear all costs of litigation and any damages resulting from attempted enforcement.