In recent months, the U.S. has claimed substantial progress in Iraq’s security situation, resulting from its new approach of enlisting the aid of Sunni leaders in the battle against Islamic militants. While the support of local government is undoubtedly essential to any successful counter-terrorism measures, enlisting former supporters of Saddam Hussein to crack down on militant Islamists revives the ghost of the Reagan administration’s “realist” foreign policy that led to support of Saddam’s brutal regime in the first place.
The U.S. military asserts that 75% of al-Qaeda networks in Iraq have been destroyed. This is an unverifiable claim, since terrorist networks are secretive by design, so we cannot know with any certainty how many there are, much less how many are affiliated with al-Qaeda. Nonetheless, a measurable decrease in the incidence of terrorist attacks is evidence that these groups are less effective and less numerous, while the legitimization of local Sunni leaders has diminished the incentive for sectarian violence, so that the insurgency is largely reduced to Islamic extremists.
Overall statistics bear out the view that the security situation in Iraq is improving. Iraqi deaths from violence have decreased substantially in the last six months, returning to 2005 levels. Civilian deaths are slightly higher than 2005 levels, while Iraqi security force deaths are substantially lower. US military deaths in recent months have decreased to the lowest levels since the occupation began. These trends suggest a disengagement between the security forces and the guerrillas, as the latter pursue softer targets.
While the recent surge in U.S. troop strength was probably a contributing factor to the decrease in violence, we should not overlook other important developments, such as the six-month ceasefire announced in August by Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mehdi Army in August, which neatly coincides with the most dramatic drop in violent deaths. Most importantly, former Sunni insurgents are now aiding the Americans in the fight against al-Qaeda and its imitators. The decrease in violence may therefore come at a great price, by legitimizing former Saddam loyalists, who may compete with Moqtada al-Sadr as domestic power brokers in Iraq. Although al-Qaeda in Iraq is presently the most immediate physical security threat, it is probably the least of the long-term threats to Iraqi peace, as all the major players, from the Sunni militias to Sadr’s Shi’a supporters and their Iranian allies, have no interest in seeing a militant Wahhabist Sunni state such as al-Qaeda seeks. However, their competing interests remain no less real, and the political failures of the Iraqi government are no less transparent, so that their remains a real threat of partition or civil war, though the fighting has stopped at least for now.