When Vladimir Putin invaded the Ukraine in 2022, he effectively ended Russia’s rise as a power broker in Eastern Europe and in the world at large. This stunning unforced error made it impossible to sustain any pretext of being a member in good standing of an emerging multipolar world. Had he merely attempted to secure the Donbass region, he might have attained realistic strategic goals without alienating anyone besides the left-of-center Westerners who already demonized him. Instead, he attempted to conquer all of Ukraine, or equivalently, to depose its government and replace it with a client state. To understand why he risked so much for so little, one need only take his Russian nationalist ideology at face value, and dispense with the myth of a master strategist favored among conspiracy-minded right wingers who yearned for a powerful adversary to the Western liberal order.
For two decades, Putin had cultivated an image of being a rational authoritarian intent on restoring Russia to her place among the great powers, though this time in a way that relied more on soft power, especially economic power in the energy sector. Germany and other nations would never have placed themselves in a state of energy dependence on Russia unless they had to some degree accepted Russia as a rational actor and member of the international community. Russia even postured as a counter-balance to the sometimes misguided military interventionism of the United States in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Putin exploited misgivings about U.S. imperialism, affecting to be defending himself against an encroaching NATO.
In 1990, while negotiating the admittance of a unified Germany into NATO, the U.S. made repeated assurances to the USSR that NATO would not expand eastward. While much of the liberal media calls this a myth, it is in fact well documented. After the dissolution of the USSR, this commitment was abandoned and Russia was in no position to oppose it. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO in 1999. A more controversial expansion occurred in 2004, with the inclusion of the former Soviet Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), along with Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Slovenia. Since then, Albania and parts of former Yugoslavia joined. In 2008,
NATO expressed its intent that Georgia and Ukraine should also become members.
Admittance of the Baltics and former Warsaw pact states to NATO was at the insistent application of these nations, who wished to orient themselves with Europe and have protection against Russian domination. It is already telling that Russia has so few willing allies. Russia, still following a “spheres of influence” concept of international relations, desires satellite states for its own good, but the U.S. and EU offer tangible benefits, not mere subordination, to their allies.
It is eminently reasonable for Putin to be mistrustful of NATO expansion, though the fact remains he is able to offer only a stick and no carrot to both Georgia and Ukraine, invading the former in 2008. No one outside of Russia seriously envisions a land invasion of Russia from eastern NATO countries, which have fewer than 2000 NATO troops each. The expansion rankles Russia not because it provides a real existential threat, but because the mutual-defense pact frustrates any possible designs of using military power against its former satellites and Soviet republics. This is a problem only because Russia is utterly wanting in soft power.
Putin tried to present Russia as integrated in the world’s political and economic power structure, through membership in the G8, friendly relations with some U.S. and European heads of state, collaborations with NASA, joint energy projects, and some diplomatic and counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East. Hosting the Winter Olympics (2014) and FIFA World Cup (2018) reinforced this image of a new, modern Russia that attained power through economic, diplomatic and cultural influence.
The West, however, takes economic battles no less seriously than military conflicts. When Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych rejected an EU association agreement in late 2013, it resulted in public protests by the Euro-friendly opposition. U.S. politicians professed solidarity with the protestors, and covertly the State Department was interfering to achieve its desired goal of ousting Yanukovych, as evidenced in a leaked State Department phone call. Vice President Biden is mentioned on this call, as he was involved in Ukraine policy, and shortly after the April 2014 revolution his son Hunter joined the board of Ukraininian energy company Burisma Holdings. Infamously, President Trump’s first impeachment resulted from his 2019 demand that Ukrainian President Zelenskyy investigate the Bidens’ dealings in Ukraine. While the leftist media repeats incessantly the absurd fantasy that Trump is some kind of Russian agent, we are to ignore the dirt on the hands of the left meddling in Ukraine. By invoking the childish word “whataboutism,” they hope to defuse any accusation of hypocrisy. We do not pretend that the sins of the left excuse those of the right; we commit no logical fallacy by pointing out the insincerity and immorality of both parties. On the contrary, it is rationally essential to grasp that the left is every bit as ruthless and amoral as the “authoritarians” they oppose, so we understand this as a power conflict rather than a moral conflict.
Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 was an understandable reaction to the overthrow of a pro-Russian Ukrainian goverment in favor of a more European-oriented one. Crimea is predominantly (67%) Russian in ethnicity and holds naval strategic importance. As much as the hypocritical West professed outrage at this violation of Ukrainian sovereignty, they continued to do business with Russia, though they used this act as an excuse for sanctions against their competitor.
Putin believes that Ukraine is a “made up” nation, as it was historically a part of Russia. Indeed, Kievan Rus was Russia, and the distinctions among the ethnicities we now call Russian, Ukrainian and Belarussian emerged gradually, and none has greater claim than another to be more authentically or originally Russian. The notion of Ukrainian nationalism did not arise until the 19th century, and the name Ukraine was not favored over Little Russia until the 20th century. The Ukraine SSR’s borders did not align with ethnic geography; this was partly by Soviet design to suppress ethnic nationalism, and partly the result of the annexation of Poland by agreement with Germany. Thus the post-Soviet state called “Ukraine” had an ethnically Russian east and ethnically Polish west.
Ukraine is an “invented” nation, as indeed all nations are, but it is no less real on account of its novelty. Ukrainian national identity, existent even before the dissolution of the USSR, strengthened over the next two decades. Putin’s invasion was at least a decade too late if he expected it to be welcomed by a significant fraction of the population. If anything, by this act he has done more than anyone to solidify Ukrainian national identity for good.
The integration of Ukraine with European culture had been ongoing for many years, which is why the reaction of Europe to the invasion has been so decisive. This was an attack on a European country, where people from all over Europe attend university, live and work. The invasion could hardly be seen as anything but a proximate attack on Europe itself, and a shameless discarding of all the norms required for membership in the European community. By this act, Putin revealed himself to be a brute, not a European. The attempted conquest of Ukraine was the equivalent of defecating on the floor, swiftly casting aside any veneer of civilization.
The thorough miscalculation by Putin before and during this war should lay to rest any myth about him being some master strategist. Apart from his false belief that Ukrainians in any significant numbers share his myth about Russian nationalism, he seemed not to think that Europe would impose any serious repercussions on Russia. Most significantly, the actual prosecution of the invasion has been inept, and exposed the poor logistical capabilities and tactical incompetence of the Russian military. What was once its greatest strength, sheer force of numbers, has also evaporated, as most of the truly combat-ready units have already been committed. It is Russia, not the U.S., which most frequently makes unsubtle reference to its nuclear capabilities, in admission of its conventional military weakness.
Worse, Russia has few reliable allies, as even China has maintained ostensible neutrality, and purchases Russian natural gas only at a steep discount. Western sanctions are incapable of sinking Russia, for its natural resources will always find a market. Financial sanctions failed to ruin the ruble, which actually rebounded above pre-war levels by May 2022. Nonetheless, Russia’s soft power is limited. By 2023, Europe has weaned itself off of Russian energy sufficiently for energy prices to become manageable, though still well above pre-war levels. Economically, Russia needed Europe more than Europe needed Russia. The replacement of integration with confrontation harms Russia, which was much more powerful as a competitor than as an enemy of the West.
The political, economic, and military weaknesses of Russia, to some extent exposed by the invasion and to some extent created by it, may come as a disappointment to those who saw Putin as some Clausewitzian mastermind who could outmaneuver the West, holding in check its more noxious postmodern cultural influences. A Christian nationalist who stood firm against sexual nihilism and other perceived decadences appealed to many on the right, and even today there are some conspiracy-minded conservatives who like to think Putin is playing some incomprehensible long game. On the contrary, it is likely due to his impending mortality that Putin decided to think short-term and resolve the Ukraine issue decisively and swiftly, solidifying his perceived destiny of the restorer of a Russian empire. This best explains why he has thrown caution to the wind, squandered whatever good will he may have built up in the past, and now commits extensive forces to a much more limited goal of securing territory that was already sympathetically Russian.
The biggest indictment of Putin’s supposed genius is the poverty of what even a victory might have achieved. A conquered Ukraine would be an unmanageable and fiercely resistant country, reverting to autonomy the moment that military occupation ceases. The economic benefit would be more than offset by the cost for years to come, and there was no realistic prospect of holding most of the country for more than a few years. Winning allies by naked conquest is no longer practicable, even if it were ethical, as Russia should have learned from recent failures of American intervention. Putin failed to perceive that Ukraine is for the most part no longer Russian and will never return to the Russian sphere by mere force.
As Russia’s true allies are limited to Belarus and some Central Asian republics, there is no realistic prospect of Russia regaining superpower status, if that means the ability to project power globally. Russia’s population crisis has accelerated, with now less than half the population of the United States, and the annexation of Ukraine, with its own demographic crisis, would hardly have helped matters. A cold realist would have recognized that the most profitable trajectory for Russia would be as a regional power integrated in a multipolar international community. Putin’s imperialist pretensions only succeeded in weakening Russia, making the world less multipolar than it would have been otherwise.
