The brouhaha raised in Britain over the Archbishop of Canterbury’s suggestion that sharia law be partially legitimized has exposed the statism at the core of secularism and the fragility of the truce that traditional cultures have made with one another through liberalism. Secularist peace comes at the price of ethnic and religious identity; man is freed from his church and neighbor only to be enslaved by the state, which claims unlimited jurisdiction over civil society.
Several forces combined to create the excessive reaction to Archbishop Rowan Williams’ comments. First, sharia itself is popularly demonized as being brutal or barbaric, in the sense of endorsing draconian violence and not respecting liberal ideals regarding gender equality, apparently forgetting that these are less than a century old, and we can hardly expect all rational people to share our arbitrary mores. This line of criticism ignores the fact that Dr. Williams only proposed applying sharia in the way that Jewish courts are applied to financial and marital contracts, as a civil arbitration agreed to by both parties, so there is no question of coercion. Further, as Dr. Williams points out, sharia is not a monolithic system of law, but a method of jurisprudence applicable only to Muslims who voluntarily submit to the law, so it is not incompatible with pluralism.
Another point of criticism is found in the Archbishop’s astonishing statement that for citizens “to be under the rule of the uniform law of a sovereign state” with all other commitments being private in character “is a very unsatisfactory account of political reality in modern societies.” He attacks the heart of liberal political theory, which takes pride in equality before the law, without regard for personality. Before the so-called Enlightenment, political philosophy was more sophisticated on this point, recognizing that laws ought to be tailored to local circumstances and customs, and that there is no one-size-fits-all system of government or law. This political wisdom was retained in the federal system of the United States in the nineteenth century, though this was gradually undermined in favor of a European model of increased centralization. The centralized state had expanded at the expense of local government and civil society long before the French Revolution; indeed, the revolutionaries simply inherited the marvelous administrative apparatus of the ancien regime. As liberal democracy spread, clerical and aristocratic privileges were abolished, so all political power was consolidated in the state. In the process, the state acquired powers historically foreign to it, including the regulation of marriage and private financial matters.
These historical developments have led to a profoundly statist European culture that views any attempt by businesses, churches, or other institutions to assert their legal independence as cause for alarm. In the case of churches, a panic over theocracy arises whenever a church refuses to submit to the generic morality of the state. Such fears are thoroughly irrational, as the state, being far more powerful than any church, is a far greater threat to liberty than any ecclesiastical bogeymen. The masses flee the supposed tyranny of traditional institutions to labor under the much heavier yoke of modern government, which levies higher taxes than any ancient tyrant ever dared, and claims unlimited jurisdiction over all human affairs. This idolatrous concept of the state, circumscribed by neither natural nor divine law, was candidly described by Max Weber as the monopolization of the legitimate use of force, and of lawmaking. Today, the Weberian state so jealously guards its monopoly over violence, that it would pretend to have authority to decide whether parents may spank their children. Where one stands on such an issue is only of secondary importance; what matters is that the state actually claims the right to decide the issue, as for all human affairs. The state alone can coerce; the state alone can demand obedience, while other institutions only meekly request it of their members.
In the United States and much of the Americas, statist tendencies are checked by a robust cultural heritage of limited government, but in most of Western Europe, including Britain, statism is conventional wisdom. Indeed, the more stridently secularist parties tend to have the firmest conviction that the state ought to have plenary jurisdiction over civil society. The fatal mistake of statist liberalism is to mistake democracy as the basis of liberty, when the real basis of liberty is limited government. A state with absolute sovereignty is just as tyrannical whether it is monarchically or democratically constituted.
Rowan Williams has touched a sore nerve by pointing out that liberal democracy contradicts its promise of tolerance and multiculturalism by insisting on a uniform rule of law, without regard for what is reasonable in specific cultural contexts. By doing so, liberal governments deny many groups “the right to speak in their own voice”, as when they pass laws and rulings that admit no exception for religious conscience, defining their secularist views (often a minority opinion!) as the basis for what is reasonable, coherent and acceptable. It would seem they do not despise tyranny so much as they prefer their own sort of tyranny.
Archbishop Williams did not dare to suggest that the state’s sovereignty be circumscribed, but only proposed that people may voluntarily submit to other sources of authority. He is not ready to abandon the Weberian state, but even the concession that there should be any human authority besides the state is too much for many secularists to bear, even though in fact Britain already allows civil arbitration by religious courts. Hatred of religion is strong enough in some to make them forget their contempt of bureaucrats and strenuously endorse the monopoly of the state.
Just as the Romans subverted all local cultures and religions by including foreign gods in the Roman pantheon and requiring only that Caesar be worshipped universally, so too does liberalism undermine the freedom of local culture, as witnessed by the devastation of French and Italian rural cultures, replacing them with an increasingly amorphous, bland consumerism. The great paradox of the Enlightenment is that supposed political liberty has led to cultural homogenization, masked by a bewildering diversity of consumer goods. This is because the only social mores that are enforceable are those of the state. With the magnitude of modern states, an individual’s vote counts for practically nothing, and in fact he can do little to alter the bureaucratic system in which he is enmeshed. He is nominally a citizen, but practically a subject, and if he calls himself an atheist, he should be humbled to learn he is no less a slave of Caesar than the most superstitious pagan.
In addition to the issues raised by Dr. Williams, sharia presents a special challenge to the West in that it does not recognize a neat distinction between religious and civil law (a medieval European development), much less a Weberian concept of the state and civil society. In Islam, society is an integrated whole. One does not need to share this holistic view of society to present a stumbling block to the liberal model; one only needs social principles at odds with those of the liberal state. The social peace of liberalism is a sort of devil’s peace where all one’s enemies are dead or enslaved, as all institutions are silent before the overwhelming force of the state (or more realistically, the state and its friends in the private sector). The Weberian state can make life materially pleasant, but woe to the one who conscientiously prefers a distinct set of social principles, not to be relegated to the ghetto of “private” activity.