The U.S. invasion of Iraq and its disastrous consequences has been justified by a constantly shifting narrative: protection from terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), enforcement of UN resolutions, punishment of war crimes, and establishing democracy. These rationalizations of a policy that failed to meet classical just war criteria as well as modern international law and American national interests is predicated on a cynical manipulation of reality in which the public has been expected to forget what the government said and did only a few years ago. The obvious rush to war in late 2002 and early 2003 has been reinvented as an innocent mistake due to faulty intelligence, and the mass murders of Saddam Hussein are now condemned, while neglecting to mention that most of these were committed with the full support of the Reagan administration. Even more absurd is the war apologists’ claim to have been concerned with violations of UN resolutions, when the UN was satisfied with Iraq’s compliance and it was the U.S. that twice forced weapons inspectors out of Iraq. All of these facts are a matter of public record, making it all the more frightening that they can be routinely denied.
This blatant attempt to rewrite recent history is reminiscent of the totalitarian regime in George Orwell’s 1984, which declared, We are at war with Eurasia. We have always been at war with Eurasia.
Anyone who pointed out that Eurasia had been our ally last year was swiftly re-educated. Similarly, Americans have been repeatedly asked to disregard the past as they remembered it a few years ago and to accept the new official history. For the benefit of those who dimly recall things being quite different from what we were later told, but lack the energy to research the matter, I present the documented history of U.S. involvement in Iraq, extracted, as it were, from the memory hole.
If the runup to the invasion of Iraq has been obscured by the fog of disinformation, the 1980s are downright prehistoric. Yet it is necessary to tell the tale of this prehistory in order to properly establish the background for the two wars against Iraq. This prehistory is the story of Saddam Hussein when he had a quite different relationship with the U.S. Not only did the Americans tolerate the devil, they armed and supplied him, and encouraged some of his greatest crimes.
Saddam’s dealings with the U.S. date back to his early political life. Saddam was recruited by the CIA in 1959 to kill Iraqi dictator General Abd al-Karim Qasim, who had started buying Soviet arms and appointing Communists to his government, and threatened to nationalize the oil industry. On 7 October, Saddam and his assassination squad botched their attempt on Qasim, so Saddam fled to Beirut, Lebanon via Syria with the help of Egyptian agents. The CIA paid for his apartment in Beirut, and helped him get to Cairo, where Saddam regularly visited CIA agents in the American embassy. All of these facts have been independently verified by British scholars, former U.S. diplomats and former CIA agents, and compiled in a 2003 report by United Press International.
General Qasim was eventually deposed in a February 1963 coup by members of his own Ba’ath Party. Accounts of former CIA officials conflict as to whether the agency was involved in the coup. One very senior
official adamantly insisted that the agency was taken by surprise by the event. Regardless of the level of prior involvement, the CIA was pleased with the result, and regarded the coup as a policy success. Since the ruling Baathists were now purging Communists, the CIA provided lists of suspected Communists to Iraqi National Guardsmen. Many of these suspects were summarily executed; others were jailed and interrogated first, then killed. A former senior State Department official told UPI: We were frankly glad to be rid of them. You ask that they get a fair trial? You have to get kidding. This was serious business.
Jim Critchfield, a senior CIA official in the Middle East, called the mass killings a great victory,
an attitude verified by a friend and fellow operative: Jim was an old Middle East hand. He wasn’t sorry to see the Communists go at all. Hey, we were playing for keeps.
The Ba’ath Party was overthrown months later, and Saddam ended up in jail until the party was restored to power in July 1968. In November 1969, he was appointed deputy to President Hassan al Bakr and Deputy Secretary General of the Iraqi Ba’ath. In a meeting with British ambassador H.G. Balfour Paul, Saddam outlined his position with regard to the West, here related by the ambassador:
Firstly, then, it was no good trying to separate the Palestine problem from others since by now it coloured the thinking of all Arabs on all subjects. Britain and the West could not wholly escape the burden of history. Yet France, though its past standing in the Arab world could not compare with Britain’s, had by a few simple gestures (for that was all that was required) acquired the friendship of the Arab world. He would welcome the restoration of warm and meaningful relations with Britain (and with America too for that matter) which would follow if we could only bring ourselves to show a little greater determination over Palestine. Secondly, we were totally wrong if we believed the Iraqi Ba’athists to have any natural affinity with the Soviet bloc. Ba’athism had nothing to do with Communism. He well knew that the long-term aims of the Soviet Union were to communize the world and subject it to Muscovite domination. He was aware of the risks involved in Iraq’s present close association with the Soviet bloc, which was forced upon it by the central problem of Palestine....His Government had repeatedly told the Russians that, whatever its relations with the Eastern bloc, it had no intention of turning its back on the West. (20 December 1969)
Iraq’s relationship with the West was complicated by the Palestine issue, as was the case with other Arab nations. When Lyndon Johnson assumed the U.S. presidency in November 1963, he would shift his nation’s Middle East policy to unrestrained support of Israel, alienating much of the Arab world. Arab nations opposing Israel had to turn to the Soviet Union for military support. When Israel seized territories from three of its Arab neighbors after the Six-Day War of 1967, Arab outrage magnified, as did the urgency to militarize further. Iraq renounced diplomatic relations with the U.S. in the wake of the war. Americans who are blissfully unaware of their nations disastrous Palestinian policy are unable to appreciate the reasons for anti-U.S. sentiment in the Arab world. The Palestine issue is not a mere excuse for hostility toward the U.S., but a chief grievance throughout the Arab world, with substantial implications for many of its nations. Iraqi passion for the Palestine issue is a manifestation of Arab nationalism, and dates back at least to the late 1930s, when the British and Jews suppressed the Arab revolt in Palestine, and many Palestinians fled to Iraq afterward.
In 1972, the U.S. cooperated with Iran and Israel to attempt to destabilize Iraq by fomenting rebellion among the Kurds in the north. Israel and Iran had attempted a similar scheme to arm and train Kurds for revolt back in 1958. President Nixon and the Shah of Iran provided millions of dollars in weapons and logistical support, and the CIA gave the Kurds $16 million in funding from 1972 to 1975. A Congressional investigation, the Pike Commission, concluded that none of the nations who were aiding [the Kurds] seriously desired that they realize their objective of an autonomous state.
The committee also concluded:
The president, Dr. Kissinger, and the Shah hoped that our clients would not prevail. They preferred instead that the insurgents simply continue a level of hostilities sufficient to sap the resources of our ally’s [Iran’s] neighbouring country. The policy was not imparted to our clients, who were encouraged to continue fighting.
By 1975, 45,000 Kurds, supported by Iranian troops, had engaged 80% of the Iraqi army. Kissinger did not want to cause the collapse of the Iraqi regime, but only to weaken it as a regional power that could threaten Israel, and also to discourage other Arab nations from seeking Soviet patronage. Eight hours after Iraq agreed to U.S.-Iranian terms (expressed in the Algiers Accord of March 1975), Iran and the U.S. cut off all aid to the Kurds, including food. With their supplies and lines of retreat cut off, the Kurds were at the mercy of the Iraqi army. Their fighting force in tatters, about 200,000 Kurds fled to Iran. The U.S. refused humanitarian assistance to the Kurdish refugees, and denied political asylum even to those who qualified. Iran forcibly expelled 40,000 of the refugees, while Iraq undertook a massive relocation program displacing 250,000 Kurds to central and southern Iraq. The Pike Commission strongly condemned the cynical betrayal of the Kurds, which cost them thousands of casualties and a humanitarian crisis affecting hundreds of thousands. Kissinger’s response was infamous: Covert action should not be confused with missionary work.
It should be noted that Kissinger’s top aide during these events was Brent Scowcroft, who would advise the elder Bush during the Persian Gulf War.
In the Algiers Accord of 6 March 1975, Iran agreed to put an end to all infiltrations of a subversive nature,
in exchange for Iraq agreeing to resolve a long-standing border dispute favorably to Iran. Saddam Hussein personally represented Iraq in direct negotiations with the Shah of Iran. The border between Iran and Iraq south of Basra was roughly defined by the Shatt al-Arab waterway, but the precise location of the border had been disputed for centuries between the Ottomans and Persians. Since Arab tribes lived on both banks of the river, the Ottomans claimed a right to this entire area. The Persians, on the other hand, believed the river itself was the boundary, so the waterway should be split between the two empires. The Persians, and their successors in the modern state of Iran, favored a division along the thalweg line, defined by the deepest point of the river, which was close to the Iraqi side. Since no treaty had clarified this dispute, Iran and Iraq had tentatively used the median line, equidistant between banks, as the border. The Algiers Accord specified that the thalweg line would define the border, giving Iran most of the waterway, albeit the shallower part.
After the crisis had passed, the Iraqis sought clarification as to where they now stood with respect to the United States. Kissinger met with Sadun Hammadi, the Iraqi minister of Foreign Affairs, on 17 December 1975, and engaged in a frank discussion of the most sensitive issues. Kissinger sought to persuade the Iraqis that there was no basic clash of national interests between Iraq and the United States.
Hammadi strongly objected to the U.S. military buildup of Israel, and noted the incompatibility of American support of Israel with the Iraqi position that Israel has no right to exist, being established by force
and a clear-cut case of colonialism.
Most importantly, Israel was a direct threat to Iraq’s national security,
due to its sophisticated weaponry supplied by the U.S. We think the U.S. is building up Israel to have the upper hand in the area…. A strong powerful, nuclear Israel….
Hammadi believed that as long as Israel existed, there could be no peace,
because Israel is not a state to stay within what they are. Because if there is an opportunity, they will expand. The record shows it. And they are supported by the biggest power in the area. What the United States is doing is not to create peace but to create a situation dominated by Israel, which will create a new wave of clashes.
Kissinger tried to allay Iraqi fears by informing him that Nixon’s Middle East policy since 1973 was independent of the Jewish lobby, which had dominated previous American policy. Past American support for Israel had been motivated by domestic politics, not imperial ambitions. We don’t need Israel for influence in the Arab world. On the contrary, Israel does us more harm than good in the Arab world.
While Kissinger and Nixon were unwilling to compromise on Israel’s right to exist, they could agree to reduce its size to historical proportions.
With Israel limited in size, and the Arabs continuing to develop technologically, Kissinger anticipated that in ten to fifteen years, Israel will be like Lebanon—struggling for existence, with no influence in the Arab world.
Kissinger also indicated that new weapons would not be delivered to Israel in the foreseeable future.
Kissinger also anticipated that financial aid to Israel, currently $2–$3 billion per year, would be reduced, since this was financially unsustainable. Moreover, anti-corruption legislation would reduce the leverage of the Jewish lobby, and much of the American public and its leaders had become hostile to uncritical support of Israel.
According to Kissinger, the Israelis intended to provoke Arabs in Lebanon and Syria into a war they believed they could win. They also sought to promote legislation against arms sales to Arab nations, so the Arabs would adopt an anti-American stance. So they can say they are the only American friend in the Middle East.
Lastly, Kissinger indicated that the Nixon administration was open to the idea of a Palestinian state, and even negotiating with the Palestine Liberation Organization, if the PLO would recognize Israel and accept UN Resolution 242. It did not matter whether Israel recognized the PLO, Kissinger reasoned, since, With all respect, what Israel does is less important than what the United States does.
The U.S. could work with Arab leaders on the Palestine issue, drawing a strong line against the destruction of Israel, yet allowing for the possibility of reducing Israel’s size and strength.
Hammadi was equally frank with Kissinger, and broached the issue of American support of the Kurds in the recent conflict. Kissinger replied,
When we thought you were a Soviet satellite, we were not opposed to what Iran was doing in the Kurdish area. Now that Iran and you have resolved it, we have no reason to do any such thing. I can tell you we will engage in no such activity against Iraq’s territorial integrity and are not.
The U.S. no longer believed that Iraq was a Soviet satellite. We think you are a friend of the Soviet Union, but you act on your own principles.
Kissinger even allowed that the Iraqis were free to pursue an economic relationship with the Soviet Union.
Hammadi was not satisfied, understanding well that Iraqi relations with the Soviet Union led the United States to intervene and encourage a movement that would cut our country to pieces.
Kissinger asked Hammadi to forget the past, and consider the Americans’ tolerance of Syria’s relationship with the USSR as evidence that the U.S. respects Arab sovereignty. Notwithstanding these assurances, the road to restoring diplomatic relations would have to be slow and cautious, due to understandable Iraqi mistrust.
Kissinger’s mission to Baghdad was unsuccessful, as the Iraqis insisted on a militant stance against Israel, and ultimately would abrogate the Algiers Accord in 1980. By the time that happened, however, U.S. policy had altered considerably.
In 1979, the Shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, was overthrown in a revolution that established an Islamic Republic headed by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The autocratic Shah had been widely perceived as a Western puppet, in part because of the CIA-sponsored coup that brought him to power in 1953. The Shah’s secret police force was organized with the help of the CIA and the Israeli spy agency Mossad. His regime was notorious for its use of torture and extrajudicial killings.
The U.S. refused to extradite the exiled Shah to stand trial for his numerous crimes. On 4 November, several hundred militant Iranian students took 66 hostages from the American embassy in Tehran. The women and blacks were released, leaving 52 in captivity. The new Iranian government endorsed the capture of these Americans after the fact, and in February 1980, issued demands for the hostages’ release. These included the return of the Shah to Iran, an American apology for its involvement in Iran, including the 1953 coup, and a promise not to interfere in Iran’s domestic affairs in the future.
President Jimmy Carter would not meet any of these demands, as he was a strong advocate of the exercise of American power, contrary to popular portrayals of him as a dove or an internationalist. Carter’s unilateralism was in evidence when he repeatedly opposed UN security resolutions condemning Israeli human rights violations or upholding Palestinian rights, often with the U.S. being the sole dissent. This was a departure from Nixon’s moderate policy and a return to the old uncritical endorsement of the Jewish lobby. Carter also aggressively engaged the Soviet Union in a proxy war in Afghanistan, abandoning Nixon’s policy of détente. He imposed stiff economic penalties against the Soviets and boycotted the Moscow Olympics, defending his actions in his January 1980 State of the Union address, where he articulated what would be called the Carter Doctrine:
Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.
To back up this doctrine, Carter built up a Rapid Deployment Force in the Persian Gulf and increased the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Despite his alarmist claims about the outside
Soviet threat to the region, Carter knew that internal strife in the Middle East posed a more likely threat to U.S. economic interests (the vital interests
of the U.S. are invariably commercial). His national security adviser admitted that the primary purpose of the RDF was helping a friendly government under a subversive attack.
Carter dealt with the Iranian crisis with similar forcefulness, imposing economic sanctions, deporting some Iranians from the U.S., and freezing $8 billion in assets. He secretly ordered Operation Eagle Claw, a complex military rescue mission with eight helicopters and twelve other aircraft, supported by the elite Delta Force counter-terrorism group and over 100 Army Rangers. After the Americans had infiltrated the country, the mission went horribly awry as a helicopter crashed into one of the cargo planes, exposing the mission. The wrecked aircraft was a propaganda coup for the Iranians, and in the U.S. came to symbolize Carter’s supposed weakness or softness.
In July 1980, the Shah died in Cairo, Egypt, rendering one of the Iranian demands moot.
On 22 September 1980, Saddam Hussein, now President of Iraq (having forced al-Bakr into retirement in 1979), invaded Iran and bombed the Tehran airport. There had been skirmishes over the Shatt al-Arab waterway for ten months, and Saddam saw the political chaos in Iran as an opportunity to obtain exclusive rights over both banks of the river and several islands held by Iran since 1971, and at the same time cripple the Iranian military. Saddam had the support of CIA-backed Iranian exiles wishing to reverse the radical Shi’ite revolution, and apparently from President Carter. When Reagan’s Secretary of State Alexander Haig first visited the Middle East in April 1981, he reported in a top secret presidential briefing that President Carter gave the Iraqis a green light to launch the war against Iran through [Saudi prince, later king] Fahd.
Carter has emphatically denied complicity in the invasion.
Haig also learned from Prince Fahd and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat that Iran had been receiving military spares for U.S. equipment from Israel.
Since Iran had long been a U.S. client, it was dependent on American military hardware upgrades and replacement parts. The Iraqi invasion suddenly made the Iranians dependent on the U.S. for military supplies, giving Carter important negotiating leverage for the hostages’ release. Israeli arms trafficking undermined Carter's diplomacy, yet it was hardly plausible that Israel would support the virulently anti-Semitic Iranian regime on its own initiative.
It is likely that Republicans independently negotiated with the Iranians for the hostages’ release, in order to prevent Carter from getting an electoral boost in October. Most of the details of these negotiations cannot be verified, nor can we conclusively determine whether the Iranians were asked to delay release of the hostages until after Reagan won the 1980 presidential election and was inaugurated the following January. Still, there are some potent testimonies from which we may sketch an outline of events. Former Israeli intelligence official Ari Ben-Menashe claimed in sworn testimony before Congress in 1991-92 that in October 1980 he saw George Bush and William Casey in a Paris hotel as they headed to a meeting with Iranian cleric Mehdi Karrubi. The testimony that Bush and Casey were in Paris the weekend of 18-19 October has been corroborated by other witnesses, including a CIA-backed arms dealer, Jamshid Hashemi, who claimed that his brother Cyrus had organized shipments from Israel to Iran after a secret meeting in Madrid in July. The chief of French intelligence, Alexandre deMarenches, affirmed that he helped Casey arrange meetings with Iranians in Paris in 1980. On 21 October, Reagan publicly commented that he had a secret plan
to release the hostages.
A detailed account from the Iranian perspective is given by Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, who was Iran’s first president after the revolution. Bani-Sadr learned of a Republican secret deal
in July 1980 from the Ayatollah Khomeini’s nephew Reza Passendideh, who had met with Cyrus Hashemi and Republican lawyer Stanley Pottinger in Madrid on 2 July. Bani-Sadr was told by Passendideh that if he refused the Republicans’ proposal, they would make the same offer to his political rivals. He further said that they [the Republicans] have enormous influence in the CIA. … Lastly, he told me my refusal of their offer would result in my elimination.
Bani-Sadr claims to have resisted these threats, seeking an immediate release of the hostages. He was opposed by Ayatollah Khomeini, who favored the Republican scheme, yet agreed to reopen secret talks with Carter in early September, leading to a tentative agreement for the hostages’ release.
The Iranian negotiator, Sadegh Tabatabai, named four conditions for the hostages’ release: a U.S. pledge not to interfere in Iranian internal affairs, the unblocking of Iran’s frozen assets, elimination of all economic sanctions and U.S. claims against Iran, and the return of the Shah’s wealth in the U.S.
(Time, 2 Feb. 1981) These demands were repeated by Khomeini in a public speech on 12 September. As Saddam had not yet invaded Iran, there was no need to demand arms shipments, even if that had been politically feasible. Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher met with Tabatabai in West Germany on 18-19 September, and came to a tentative agreement to release the hostages immediately in exchange for a broad statement of principle by the U.S., with details to be determined later.
After Saddam invaded Iran on 22 September, the Iranian deal with Carter evaporated, as the need for arms became critical. The Iranians turned back to the Republicans, meeting with Reagan campaign director William Casey and possibly George Bush on 18-19 October in Paris. Bush has adamantly denied attending the Paris meeting, and produced partial Secret Service records for his whereabouts that weekend, though refusing to release complete records. No evidence could be found regarding Casey’s whereabouts on those dates in 100,000 pages of campaign documents. A 1992 congressional investigation exonerated Bush and regarded the claim that the Reagan campaign had dealt with Iran as lacking sufficient evidence, accusing several witnesses of perjury yet declining to press charges. A less credible witness, arms dealer Richard Brenneke, was charged with perjury in 1990, but acquitted. Nonetheless, there remain credible witnesses, such as those previously named, establishing that negotiations were at least attempted.
The secret Republican negotiations with Iran may have been unwittingly attested by Reagan himself in 1991, when the senile ex-president told reporters while golfing, This whole thing that I was worried about [the hostages’ release] as a campaign thing is absolute fiction. I did some things to try the other way … from the very beginning that they were ever held there, every effort on my part was made to get them home.
When asked if his campaign made contact with Iranians, he replied he could not get into details,
and said that some of those things are still classified,
although he was not yet president in 1980.
The Madrid and Paris meetings were confirmed by Russian secretary of the subcommittee on state security Nikolai Kuznetsov in 1993, who frankly stated that the Republicans had outbid the Carter administration in their offer of arms, procuring a delay in the release of hostages. Yasser Arafat told ex-President Carter in 1996 that Republicans had approached the PLO in 1980 to help arrange a hostage deal. (Diplomatic History, Fall 1996)
Carter, for his part, told the Village Voice that shortly before the 1980 election,
The Iranian parliament was meeting and we had every information from Bani-Sadr and others that they were going to vote overwhelmingly to let the hostages go. And at the last minute on Sunday [two days before the election] for some reason they had adjourned without voting…. The votes were there but the ayatollah or somebody commanded them to adjourn.
Whatever the extent Republican negotiations may have had in getting Iranians to postpone the release of hostages, the following events are not in dispute. After Reagan won the November election, Carter sent Warren Christopher to Algeria on 10 November, in order to finally give a detailed response to Khomeini’s demands. Two weeks later, Iran expressed interest in continuing negotiations, and on 2 December, Christopher proposed ways to resolve the issue of frozen Iranian assets. On 21 December, the Iranians demanded $24 billion in cash and gold, equal to the value of the Shah’s estate and the frozen Iranian assets with interest. When Washington ignored this request in its next proposal, the Iranians revised their estimate on 6 January 1981 to less than $10 billion. Negotiations accelerated at this point, and Carter set a deadline of 16 January, later extended to 20 January, Reagan’s inauguration day. The last sticking point was how to deal with loans the Iranians owed to American banks, but the Iranians agreed to deduct this from their settlement. Ultimately $7.9 billion in Iranian assets were returned, and the hostages were released on 20 January, shortly after Reagan’s inauguration.
Carter certainly deserves credit for obtaining the release of the hostages. The Algiers Accords signed on 19 January 1981 resolved several issues that were indispensable to the Iranians. The United States pledged not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran’s internal affairs.
The U.S. also agreed not to prosecute Iran before the International Court of Justice for seizing hostages, and to prevent individuals from making such legal claims. All Iranian assets were unfrozen and returned to Iran, together with the Shah’s estate. This agreement met all four of Khomeini’s demands, and obtained the release of the hostages.
Still, the Republican contacts with Iran addressed another need, that of military weaponry to fight Iraq. The modest shipments during 1980 would be increased in 1981 and onward, and William Casey would become head of the CIA and one of the architects of the Iran-Contra illicit arms trafficking. The U.S. and Israel had good reason to publicly deny shipping arms to the rabidly anti-American and anti-Zionist Iranian regime. Israel even denied that Ari Ben-Mashe had worked for them, until his records were located and publicized. Israeli and American military support of revolutionary Iran, whether it began in 1980 or 1981, was a solid reality that would affect the course of history in the Middle East.
Iraqi relations with Iran had deteriorated after an April 1980 assassination attempt on Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz by the Iranian-supported Ad Dawah, a religious Shi’ite political opposition party in Iraq. This and other acts of terrorism were performed in response to Saddam Hussein’s arrest of the Shi’ite religious leader Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqur as Sadr in 1979, as a precaution against Shi’ite radicalism in Iraq. In response to the Shi’ite terrorism, Saddam banned Ad Dawah, ordered the execution of Sadr, and rounded up Ad Dawah members, deporting thousands of ethnically Iranian Shi’ites to Iran.
Saddam Hussein attacked Iran in September 1980 in the hopes of acquiring long-disputed territories: the east bank of the Shatt al-Arab, the province of Khuzestan, and several islands. These areas had Arab Shi’ite populations, so their acquisition was an imperative to Saddam's Arab nationalist ideology, and they also had strategic significance, as the Shatt al-Arab was essential to Iraqi commerce, and Khuzestan was an oil-rich area containing most of Iran's crude. Saddam postured as the liberator of the Arabs in Khuzestan, which he called Arabistan, and unsuccessfully encouraged Shi’ites to rebel against the Islamic government of Iran. Saddam expected a quick victory over Iran as the local populations revolted against the government, as Iranian exiles persuaded him would be the case.
On 22 September 1980, Iraq launched a surprise bombing raid on Iranian air bases in the hopes of crippling the air force on the ground, but most of the aircraft were protected by reinforced hangars. At the same time, the Iraqi army launched a three-pronged blitzkrieg into northern, central, and southern Iran. The main thrust was in the south, where Iraq crossed the Shatt al-Arab and made deep incursions into Khuzestan. Within a few weeks of the invasion, Saddam formally abrogated the 1975 Algiers treaty, claiming the entire Shatt al-Arab for Iraq. Most foreign observers agreed that Iraq would win the war in a matter of weeks.
Iranian resistance proved unexpectedly stiff, as the government was able to bring an army of 200,000 to the front by November 1980, consisting of fanatical volunteers and veterans of the Shah’s army. Although poorly equipped, they fought fearlessly, and halted the Iraqi advance. The three million Arabs of Khuzestan did not revolt against the government, but instead many of them joined the volunteer army.
When the war began, the Soviet Union immediately withdrew its current arms shipment to Iraq, and halted further arms shipments for a year and a half. Saddam repressed the Iraqi Communist Party, which relayed broadcasts from the USSR in March 1981, calling for Iraqi withdrawal and an end to the war. New U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig saw an opportunity to exploit the rift between Iraq and the USSR, and got the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to approve the sale of five Boeing jetliners to Iraq.
After the release of the U.S. hostages, Secretary of State Haig approved the Israelis’ sale of U.S. arms to Iran on 20 February. (Wall Street Journal 12 Dec. 1986, p. 54) These shipments began within weeks, as did parallel shipments of U.S. arms to Iran by Cyrus Hashemi, who claimed this was part of an effort necessary to get the hostages released,
implying linkage with the 1980 hostage negotiations. Whatever the cause, it is clear that U.S. arms were entering Iran from multiple channels, even as Haig was promoting a conciliatory policy toward its rival Iraq. This was the beginning of a long history in which the U.S. would indirectly support both sides of the most destructive war in the modern Middle East.
On 18 July 1981, an Argentine cargo jet crashed (probably shot down) in Soviet Armenia after delivering its third shipment of arms (360 tons of American-made tank spares and ammunition) to Iran from Israel. This public exposure of the illicit arms shipments forced the State Department to assert on 21 August that they had Israeli assurance that further sales to Iran would not involve American equipment. Somehow, American arms continued to pour into Iran for years afterward. The extent of the Reagan administration’s complicity in these sales is unknown, since the Iran-Contra investigations only examined sales that took place after 1985.
Other reported deals of arms to Iran included a 1980 Jews for arms
deal negotiated by Israel’s deputy defense minister in Paris. Iranian Jews were allowed to emigrate to Israel, and in exchange Iran was sold spare parts and ammunition for its American-made tanks and aircraft. These supplies were sold through a private Israeli arms dealer, until 1984, when Iran was delinquent in payment. In 1981, Yacov Nimrodi sold $135 million worth of anti-aircraft missiles, mortars, and other ammunition and weapons. In 1984, Radio Luxembourg reported another Nimrodi arms deal that resulted in shipments of 40 truckloads of weapons a day to Iran through Syria and Turkey, according to Swiss government sources. According to the Israelis, many private European arms dealers, French in particular, sold American-made arms to Iran in defiance of the official U.S. embargo, which was accepted by European governments.
While the Israelis and others were arming Iran, the U.S. attempted to gradually open relations with Saddam Hussein’s regime. As early as April 1981, a State Department cable praised the benefits of the official U.S. arms embargo against Iran, including increased Iraqi commerce and contacts with the U.S.
Although it was premature to restore formal diplomatic relations, the Iraqi intelligence chief was already encouraged to make U.S. government contacts, and promises of greater economic cooperation were made.
In April 1981, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Morris Draper visited Baghdad, in the first high level meeting between the U.S. and Iraq since 1977. There were no formal diplomatic relations between the two countries since 1967, and the Palestine issue was still the main obstacle to restoring relations. On 12 April, Draper met with Muhammad al-Sahhaf, chief of Iraq’s First International Department (who would later achieve comic notoriety as Iraq’s information minister in 2003), and with Foreign Minister Hammadi. Sahhaf told Draper that formal diplomatic relations would be impossible until the U.S. altered its basic Middle East policies, meaning Israel. Hammadi reiterated this message, declaring that Palestine is the key to stability in the Middle East, and the means through which the Soviets were gaining influence at the expense of the U.S. He characterized the U.S. position toward Israel as one-sided and he ruled out a settlement achieved through the Camp David process. The U.S. cannot have both Israeli alliance and the friendship of the Arabs at this time and he stressed that.
Americans may not appreciate how important the Palestine issue is to the Arabs at their own peril. Draper was unable to satisfy the Iraqis on Palestine, but regarding the Iran-Iraq war, he assured them that the U.S. would not sell lethal equipment to either side, having made this position clear to other governments, but nonetheless believed that it is in the world's overall interest that the war be concluded as soon as possible.
The meeting with Hammadi was followed by an even higher level meeting on 28 May between Iraq’s Revolutionary Command Council spokesman Tariq Aziz and William Eagleton, head of the United States Interests Section in Iraq. (The U.S. often has an interests section
in nations where it does not have an embassy, but nonetheless wants to do business.) Tariq Aziz was recognized by the Americans as the highest level spokesman on foreign policy after Saddam Hussein.
Aziz expressed a desire to increase contact and trade with the U.S., while standing firm against any attempts by the U.S. to oppose Iraqi or Arab interests. The Iraqi leadership was satisfied that the U.S. had stopped interfering in Iraq's internal affairs, but relations could not be fully reopened until the U.S. re-evaluated its one-sided Palestine policy.
Eagleton reiterated the U.S. position of neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war, but Aziz complained that the Iranians were somehow acquiring American arms and spare parts. Eagleton assured Aziz that the U.S. opposed such sales, and offered to investigate these illegal transactions.
Overall, Aziz presented an Iraq that was independent, nationalistic, and socialist, yet preferring to trade with the more affluent and technologically advanced nations of the West. Eagleton said his government supported the participation of American firms in projects designed to restore Iraq’s oil facilities as rapidly as possible after the war.
Already, oil infrastructure had been targeted by both sides in the conflict. Eagleton reported to the State Department that the meeting should be helpful to our position and that of U.S. business interests in Iraq.
Since the U.S. was neutral with regard to Iraq’s internal politics and its war with Iran, the overtures to Iraq were motivated primarily by business interests.
In February 1982, the U.S. State Department, without consulting Congress, removed Iraq from its list of nations sponsoring terrorism, notwithstanding that Achille Lauro hijacker Abu Nidal was based in Baghdad. The removal of Iraq from the list (where it had been since late 1979) enabled the sale of dual-use technology to Iraq. In 1983, a State Department report concluded that Iraq continued to support groups on its terrorist list, but Iraq’s status was not changed.
The Iraqis, less tolerant of casualties than the fanatical Iranian volunteers, began to retreat after Iran’s successful penetration of their lines in March 1982. In May, Saddam announced a withdrawal from all Iranian territory, in the hope that Iran would accept a ceasefire. Offers of negotiations in June were rebuffed by the Iranians, who pressed the attack with Operation Ramadan in July, advancing into Iraqi territory near Basra. After this turn of events, the USSR ended its arms embargo on Iraq, and supplied it with tanks, rocket launchers, and helicopter gunships in order to fortify lines of defense.
Although the official U.S. policy of neutrality was scrupulously enforced by the State Department, President Reagan used the CIA to help Iraq more overtly. In June 1982, U.S. satellite intelligence showed the positions of an Iranian invasion force that threatened to break through a gap in Iraqi defenses. Reagan issued a national security directive establishing a policy of taking any legal measures necessary to prevent Iraq from being defeated. CIA director William Casey led the effort to ensure Iraq received military supplies from third-party sources. Since Iraq used Soviet-made weaponry, the U.S. embargo did not need to be violated. No authorization was needed to simply ask third parties to sell non-U.S. arms to Iraq. In particular, Gates advocated the sale of cluster bombs and armor penetrating munitions in order to enhance Iraqi military capability.
As the war turned against Iraq in 1982, Iranian troops reported the use of chemical weapons against them for the first time in the conflict. The U.S. was already aware of Iraq’s chemical weapons capacity, and a 1980 Defense Intelligence Agency report stated that Iraq had been actively acquiring
chemical weapons capabilities since the mid-1970s. In September, some U.S. firms asked the state department to authorize the sale of crop-dusting helicopters and fixed wing aircraft to Iraq in June 1983, despite the fact that these were a common means of chemical weapons deployment. Reports of chemical weapons attacks by Iraq would increase significantly in the last half of 1983. According to a 1991 Los Angeles Times report, American helicopters were in fact used for chemical weapons attacks.
In early 1983, congressional opposition to the Reagan administration’s relations with Iraq arose out of concern with Iraqi sponsorship of terrorist groups, particularly Palestinian groups that targeted Israel. The influence of the Jewish lobby guaranteed that U.S. congressmen would be more concerned with Iraq’s threat to Israel than its use of chemical weapons, which did not become an issue until 1988. Facing the possibility of legislative measures that would curtail the relationship with Iraq, Secretary of State Haig asked Aziz in May to take actions showing a rejection of international terrorism.
Iraq presented another problem to the U.S. in its nuclear program. Israel had bombed Iraq’s nuclear reactor in 1981, with the U.S. being the sole country besides Israel refusing to condemn the action in the UN General Assembly (Resolution 36/27, 13 November 1981). A 1983 CIA report concluded that Iraq’s nuclear program continued to develop despite the setback, with the goal of generating nuclear energy and probably eventually nuclear weapons. Iraq sought fuel cycle materials from Italy to rebuild its nuclear reactor, but there was still no identifiable nuclear weapon program in Iraq.
Without significant added foreign help,
they would not be able to produce the material for a nuclear weapon before the 1990s. Attaining that capability, even then, depends critically on the foreign supply of a nuclear reactor—preferably a power reactor—of substantial size fairly soon.
This meant that even with a reactor and foreign help, it would take an additional five years or more to develop weapons capability. When President George W. Bush raised the specter of mushroom clouds in 2002-03, Iraq did not even have a nuclear reactor. In the 1980s, the nuclear danger was even less plausible since any rebuilt reactor would be monitored by France or Italy in addition to the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the high energy output necessary for creating weapons material would be easily detected.
In October 1983, the State Department began to consider a shift from its neutral position in the Iran-Iraq war to favor Iraq. The position of neutrality had been motivated by a concern with protecting the Arabian peninsula, where the U.S. imported most of its petroleum, being much less dependent on Iraq and Iran. U.S. neutrality prevented the conflict from expanding south to threaten Gulf oil supplies.
Now that U.S. relations with Iraq had improved, and the regime was in danger of collapse through war and economic pressure, it seemed advisable to support Iraq more overtly. Strict neutrality had already been abandoned when Iranian forces crossed into Iraq in the summer of 1982. The U.S. favored Iraq financially and diplomatically, and provided tactical intelligence.
As soon as the State Department shifted its policy, new reports came from Iran about Iraqi use of chemical weapons on 22 October. On 1 November, a State Department memorandum informed Secretary George Shultz (who replaced Haig in July 1982) that the Iraqis were using chemical weapons almost daily.
The Iraqis were also able to produce their own chemical weapons, primarily from Western firms, including possibly a U.S. foreign subsidiary.
Reasoning that Iraq resorted to these extreme measures due to its disadvantageous position in the war, the report considered that an offer of assistance to Iraq would be our best present chance of influencing cessation of CW use.
The Iraqis had used tear gas and skin irritants against Iranians in July 1982, and in October 1982, they used lethal chemical weapons in the Mandali area. In July and August 1983, they used lethal chemicals against Iranians at Haj Umran, and more recently against Kurdish insurgents. The U.S. confronted Iraq over the issue in November, and chemical weapons use are believed to have ceased for several months.
On 20 December 1983, Reagan’s special envoy Donald Rumsfeld met with Saddam Hussein and Tariq Aziz in Baghdad. Rumsfeld conveyed Reagan’s wishes to bring the war to a speedy end. An important part of Rumsfeld’s mission was to help restore the export of Iraqi oil, which had been blocked in the Gulf by the Iranians. Reagan had even prepared a rapid deployment force in case the Iranians should try to block all shipping into the Gulf.
Saddam Hussein demonstrated an astute understanding of Middle East politics and great power interests in the region. Iraq was a non-aligned country, having relations with the USSR, yet opposing Soviet efforts to dominate the region. Saddam realized that the U.S. was not trying to bring Iraq into its orbit, but merely wished to keep Soviet influence out of the region so that commercial activity could continue unimpeded. Iraq, for its part, needed the West in order to modernize and achieve prosperity. Recognizing their common commercial interests, Saddam was willing to cooperate with the U.S. on pipelines through Jordan or Saudi Arabia in order to restore Iraqi export levels. He also recommended that the U.S. provide more aid to poorer Arab nations in order to avert the class conflict that made Soviet influence possible.
Saddam found fault with recent U.S. policies, such as its initial indifference to the Iran-Iraq war, effectively deciding to Let this group of lunatics bash each other.
(This was eerily similar to an actual comment by Henry Kissinger in 1985: I hope they kill each other. Too bad they can't both lose.
) Neutrality was not in the U.S.’ strategic interest, since Iraq protected the Gulf states from being overrun by Iran. Since the Israelis wanted the Arab world, including Saudi Arabia, to be crippled, they shipped military supplies to Iran.
Rumsfeld assured Saddam that the U.S. recognized its interest in not allowing Iraq to be weakened, and respected the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations. The U.S. had successfully closed off shipments of U.S.=controlled military equipment to Iran.
In a private meeting with Tariq Aziz the next day, Rumsfeld learned that many countries were still smuggling arms to Iran, but nonetheless, Iraqi technological superiority was such that there was no danger of Iraq losing. Aziz passed the details about smuggling to Rumsfeld, urging that the war could not end until Iran ceased to be re-armed.
On 22 December, Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger authorized the Export-Import Bank to provide supplier credits to Iraq, since the Iraqi government had finally expelled Abu Nidal from the country and ended financial aid to his terrorist group.
In January 1984, Secretary Shultz decided to impose anti-terrorism export controls on Iran, since Iran had sponsored terrorist bombings in Baghdad and Kuwait earlier in the war. Importation of petroleum from Iran to the U.S. would not be affected. The State Department also considered allowing the sale of all dual-use equipment to Iraq. They even considered selling extra tanks to Egypt so Egypt could sell its old tanks to Iraq. At this point, the U.S. was fully supporting Iraq, constrained only by political and financial considerations.
On 30 January, Shultz approved the sale of dual-use heavy trucks to Iraq, accepting that the defensive stance of the Iraqis made it unlikely these trucks would contribute significantly to the destabilization of the region.
The Reagan administration wanted to help Iraq defend itself and restore its economy, without prolonging the war or enabling one side to overrun the other. The State Department noted that European nations were already selling non-lethal
military supplies to Iraq and Iran, including tank parts and trainer
aircraft, so Shultz was asked to consider the possibility of exporting non-lethal military supplies such as surveillance, navigational, and communications systems. Shultz rejected this proposal, preferring to continue the official U.S. policy of denying export of military supplies to both nations, in order to maintain public neutrality.
In February, the Export-Import Bank expressed concern that the war would not end soon, making it unlikely that Iraq would be able to repay its supplier credits. Although in the long run, Iraq could be a major importer of U.S. agriculture, it was currently unable to export oil through the Gulf or through Syria, dramatically reducing its revenue base. While recommending restraint in the issuing of further credits, the bank nonetheless supplied a list of $1.5 billion in Iraqi civil engineering projects to be potentially awarded to Combustion Engineering, General Electric, Lockheed, Westinghouse, Bechtel, and Halliburton, among other U.S. companies.
On 21 February, the Iraqi military warned that the Iranians were planning a major offensive, and that Iraq would respond with strikes deep into Iranian territory. The statement included a veiled threat to use chemical weapons: The invaders should know that for every harmful insect there is an insecticide capable of annihilating it whatever their number and Iraq possesses this annihilation insecticide.
In early March, the State Department held up a shipment of 22,000 pounds of phosphorous fluoride to Iraq. The chemical was ostensibly to be used for manufacturing insecticides, but could also be used to make chemical weapons. Secretary Shultz ordered that previous warnings to Iraqis regarding the use of chemical weapons be reiterated, and that they be made aware that the U.S. would not allow itself knowingly to become a source of chemical weapons elements.
The administration began to prepare a statement for public condemnation of the use of chemical weapons.
The Reagan administration publicly condemned Iraq’s use of chemical weapons and sought to pursue an international ban on their manufacture. The March press release also censured attacks by both sides on civilian populations, as well as human rights violations and failure to treat prisoners of war humanely. Interestingly, the condemnation was accompanied by this statement:
The United States finds the present Iranian regime’s intransigent refusal to deviate from its avowed objective of eliminating the legitimate government of neighboring Iraq to be inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among nations and the moral and religious basis which it claims. [Emphasis added.]
It is hard to ignore the irony of this statement, in light of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 orchestrated by prominent Republicans who served in the Reagan and Bush, Sr. administrations. The government of Saddam Hussein is declared to be legitimate at the same time that the U.S. acknowledges he is using chemical weapons and committing other human rights violations.
Notwithstanding its recognition that Iraq was using chemical weapons, the State Department proceeded to authorize the sale of 2,000 heavy trucks to Iraq. When asked whether the trucks were to be used for military purposes, a department official responded, We presumed that this was Iraq’s intention, and had not asked.
The Iraqis were nonetheless highly displeased with the verbal condemnation of their tactics, and Saddam publicly accused the U.S. of supporting Iran. Meanwhile, Belgian researchers discovered traces of mustard gas and mycotoxin (yellow rain) among Iranian war wounded.
Although the U.S. had publicly stated on 5 March that the available evidence indicates that Iraq has used lethal chemical weapons,
the American delegation to the UN was instructed by Secretary Shultz to oppose an Iranian proposal to have Iraq’s action condemned by the Security Council. The delegation was told to pursue a motion to take no decision
on the resolution, and failing that, to abstain from the vote. Ultimately, no resolution was passed, but instead a statement drafted by the Dutch was issued by the Security Council president (Peru), strongly condemning the use of chemical weapons, though not mentioning Iraq by name, and calling on both parties to recognize their obligations under the Geneva Conventions.
Despite recognizing Iraqi use of chemical weapons, the Reagan administration’s stance toward Iraq was unchanged. Rumsfeld continued to pursue closer dialogue with Iraq, and to reassure the Iraqis that the U.S. still supported an Iraqi pipeline through Jordan, among other commercial projects. Although the U.S. would ban exports of certain chemicals to Iraq and Iran, there would be no air strikes against suspected Iraqi chemical weapons production facilities, nor would there be any encouragement of a boycott against Iranian oil. On 5 April, President Reagan authorized Shultz to consult with the CIA and the Department of the Defense to prepare a plan of action to avert an Iraqi collapse.
Any condemnation of chemical weapons use should place equal stress on the urgent need to dissuade Iran from continuing the ruthless and inhumane tactics which have characterized recent offensives.
On 12 December 1984 UN General Assembly passed Resolution 39/65, calling for a convention to prohibit chemical and biological weapons. Section B of the resolution called for states to refrain from the production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons in the territory of other States.
Resolution 39/65B passed with a vote of 84-1, the sole opposing vote coming from the United States. The United States continued to stockpile chemical weapons, and reserved the right to use them in retaliation of an enemy’s first use of chemical weapons. This stance was at odds with the Reagan administration’s claims in early 1984 to support a convention prohibiting chemical weapons. In 1993, the Clinton administration signed the UN-sponsored Chemical Weapons Convention, which took effect in 1997, and required the U.S. to destroy all its chemical warfare materials and production facilities by 2007.
Iraq and the United States restored full diplomatic relations on 26 November 1984, when Tariq Aziz met with President Reagan at the White House. The U.S. had no illusions about the government with which it was dealing. A Defense Intelligence Agency briefing dated 25 September described Saddam Hussein as ruthless but pragmatic,
and noted how he had eliminated all domestic opposition groups, in part by executing, jailing, and deporting suspected members
of the Shi’ite, Iranian-supported Dawa Party. The report dispassionately noted the likely repeated use of chemical weapons:
On the battleground, Iraq will continue to rely upon strong defensive positions, especially physical barriers, and the threat to use all weapons in its arsenal, to include chemicals, to dissuade any Iranian attack. In the event Tehran does launch an offensive, Baghdad will carry through with its threats to extract maximum Iranian casualties while attempting to keep its own losses to a minimum. [Emphasis added.]
U.S. support of Iraq continued despite this belief that they would continue to use chemical weapons. The report further projected that the Iraqi military would continue to develop its formidable conventional and chemical capability, and probably pursue nuclear weapons.
Still, it was judged unlikely that Iraq would use its arsenal against Israel, for fear of disproportionate retaliation. No similar concern is shown for potential attacks on Iran or Syria. U.S. support of Iraq arose from opposition to Iran, and yielded the benefit of a reduction in Iraqi-sponsored terrorism. In the future, the U.S. expected to broaden commercial ties with Iraq, and the vast majority of Iraq’s trade would be with the West. Saddam had correctly surmised that the principal U.S. objectives in Iraq were commercial.
On 17 June 1985, National Security Advisor Robert Bud
McFarlane sent a memorandum to Secretary of State George Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, suggesting a re-evaluation of U.S. policy toward Iran, in light of accelerating instability in that nation. Iran faced the possibility of political upheaval due to the pressures of the war and the failing health of Ayatollah Khomeini. Since the USSR was well-positioned to increase its influence in Iran, it was in the United States’ interest to prevent the disintegration of Iran, so it could serve as an independent strategic buffer which separates the Soviet Union from the Persian Gulf.
In order to prevent Iranian gravitation toward the Soviet Union, the U.S. needed to change its policy, encouraging allies to help Iran meet its import requirements so as to reduce the attractiveness of Soviet assistance…. This includes provision of selected military equipment as determined on a case-by-case basis.
The U.S. should also exploit political fragmentation by discreetly communicating our desire for correct relations to potentially receptive Iranian leaders
and providing support to elements opposed to Khomeini and the radicals.
This was a major departure from several important points of U.S. policy. Most notably, the U.S. would now actively encourage some limited arms shipments to Iran, even as it was supporting Iraq in the same war. The U.S. had supported Iraq for fear of the consequences of its defeat by Iran or internal destabilization. Now, its policy of holding off Iran had been so successful, that the Iranian government teetered, raising the possibility of stronger Soviet influence in the region. While the U.S. made no effort to topple Saddam Hussein, and in fact strongly opposed Iranian attempts to foment revolt among Iraqi Shi’ites, it was quite willing to promote a favorable regime change in Iran. This had to be done in a way that would not create a power vacuum that the USSR might fill, so it was necessary to seek better relations with the Iranians while Khomeini was alive. American attempts to support opponents of Khomeini would belie official claims that the U.S. did not meddle in the internal affairs of other countries.
An important goal of U.S. policy was the elimination of Iranian sponsorship of terrorism, and it was not long before the sale of arms of Iran would be directly linked to concessions on terrorism by the Iranians. Thus began the arms for hostages
portion of the Iran-Contra affair, for which President Reagan later accepted responsibility. McFarlane sent consultant Michael Ledeen to authorize Israel’s limited sale of munitions to Iran in exchange for the Iranian government’s efforts to obtain the release of American hostages by Shi’ite terrorist groups. Israeli munitions would be replenished by the U.S. From 1985 to 1986, six covert transactions took place, the most notorious being a botched November 1985 shipment of eighteen anti-aircraft missiles.
Shortly after the failed delivery, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger noted in his diary that he met with Maj. Gen. Colin Powell and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage regarding a National Security Council plan. The U.S. would let the Israelis give the Iranians fifty Hawk anti-aircraft missiles and 3300 TOW missiles in return for 5 hostages.
The NSC would present it as a means of helping group that wants to overthrow gov’t.
Since the NSC is answerable to none but the President, the plan was to be presented to Reagan. Reagan wanted to overthrow the Iranian government, so the NSC plan was presented in a way that would seem to meet that goal, though Weinberger privately admitted that there was no assurance that sending weapons to the Iranian army would serve this purpose.
Weinberger’s diary description of the 7 December meeting of the NSC with President Reagan provides a startling contrast with popular narratives of the Iran-Contra affair. It was not unscrupulous advisers, but the president himself, who was the driving force behind the decision, despite pleas for him to reconsider. As Weinberger describes it:
Met with President, Shultz, [White House Chief of Staff] Don Regan, [CIA Deputy Director] John McMahon, McFarlane, [National Security Adviser] John Poindexter
...
re NSC Iran proposal
President wants to free hostages - Thinks Hawks + TOWs would only go to "Moderate Elements in Army" + would help overthrow Iranian gov't. I argued strongly that we have an Embargo that Makes Arms Sales to Iran illegal + President couldn't violate it + that "washing" transaction thru Israel wouldn't make it legal - Shultz, Don Regan agreed. President sd. he could answer charges of illegality but he couldn't answer charge that "big strong President Reagan passed up a chance to free hostages." President left to do his noon radio
Saw Don Regan + Shultz - Don will try to talk President out of it
...
Called McFarlane in Washington - he is going to London to advise President's decision that we will not ransom our hostages - he will discuss with UK Possibility of their selling some arms to negotiators.
Called Colin Powell in Washington - re above
Shultz and Weinberger had opposed previous arms for hostages transactions, being made aware of them only after the fact. McFarlane claimed to have Reagan’s personal approval for the shipments through November, though Reagan himself could not recall giving such authorization, when questioned in 1987. The botched November shipment was certainly approved by Reagan after the fact on 5 December, as proven by a signed authorization. The 7 December meeting was the first opportunity for the entire NSC to openly debate the policy, which until now had bypassed Shultz and Weinberger. Reagan showed an astonishing lack of regard for the American arms embargo against Iran, and strangely believed that it was a show of strength for him to effectively pay a ransom for the hostages. Don Regan was able to persuade the president to change his mind, so McFarlane went to London to inform the Iranian arms dealer that the U.S. would not link arms to hostages.
This suspension of the arms-for-hostages policy was short-lived. On 9 December, Lt. Col. Oliver North submitted a memo to John Poindexter proposing that the U.S. should deliver arms directly to Iran in exchange for the release of hostages. North had been involved in previous shipments, including the failed November delivery, which he tried to rectify by having the CIA arrange the flight. Only 18 of the 80 promised missiles were delivered, so no hostages were released. Now, in December, Lt. Col. North continued to discuss an arms-for-hostages proposal with Michael Ledeen and others, so a new proposal would be put before the President in early January.
On 7 January 1986, the new arms-for-hostages proposal was discussed in a meeting attended by President Reagan, Vice-President George Bush, Secretary of State Shultz, Defense Secretary Weinberger, Attorney General Ed Meese, CIA Director Bill Casey, White House Chief of Staff Don Regan, and John Poindexter. According to Shultz, everyone at the meeting except Weinberger and himself was in favor of the proposal. On 17 January, President Reagan approved for the first time the direct sale of arms to Iran, as 4,000 TOW missiles would be provided through the CIA. The U.S. was now providing significant arms to Iran in defiance of its own embargo.
Apparently on his own initiative, Lt. Col. North diverted funds from at least one of the Israeli sales of arms to the Nicaraguan contras, which was also an illegal action. Although Reagan supported the contras, he claimed in his diary to have been unaware of this diversion of funds.
On one of the arms shipments the Iranians pd. Israel a higher purchase price than we were getting. The Israelis put the difference in a secret bank acct. Then our Col. North (NSC) gave the money to the ‘Contras.’ This was a violation of the law against giving the Contras money without an authorization by Congress. North didn’t tell me about this. Worst of all John [Poindexter] found out about it & didn’t tell me. This may call for resignations.
For our purposes, the diversion of funds to the contras is less important. The primary significance of the Iran-Contra affair is that the U.S. was now arming both sides of the Iran-Iraq war. When the arms deals were exposed in late 1986, the Arab world was outraged by the American double dealing, causing the U.S. to tilt once again toward Iraq in order to restore good faith with its Gulf allies.
By 1986, the carnage of the Iran-Iraq war had escalated considerably. Since 1984, both sides had repeatedly targeted oil tankers in the Persian Gulf (Iraq had employed this tactic since 1981); 111 neutral tankers were attacked in 1986. Since 1985, both sides repeatedly targeted civilian populations and industrial targets with air raids and missile strikes. In March 1986, the UN Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, finally condemned Iraq by name for its use of chemical weapons against Iran. The U.S. was the sole country to vote against a Security Council statement condemning Iraqi use of mustard gas against Iran.
The U.S. had long supported Iraq by providing dual-use hardware, supplier credits, and satellite data about Iranian troop movements. After the embarrassment of the Iran-Contra scandal, the Americans supported Iraq even more overtly. On 17 May 1987, the USS Stark was accidentally struck by Iraqi missiles. The U.S. used this opportunity to condemn Iranian escalation of the conflict, and reflagged Kuwaiti tankers with U.S. flags. Thus the Iranians could no longer target Arab tankers, but Iraq could still attack Iranian tankers. The U.S. attacked Iranian ships and destroyed an Iranian oil platform in October 1987, and again in April 1988. On 3 July 1988, the USS Vincennes, inside Iranian territorial waters, shot down an Iranian commercial airliner, killing all 290 aboard.
In July 1987, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 598, calling for a ceasefire and Iranian withdrawal. Iran was not willing to withdraw immediately, until responsibility for the conflict had been determined by the impartial commission mandated by Resolution 598. The Iranians were willing to accept an informal ceasefire in the meantime, but the U.S. opposed UN attempts at a compromise, and pressed for an arms embargo against Iran, as Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy had personally promised Saddam Hussein in May.
American stonewalling prevented a ceasefire from occurring in early 1988. This had fateful consequences, as the final months of the war witnessed an escalation of Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Kurds and Iranians. The most monstrous crime was the genocidal use of chemicals against the Kurds beginning in February 1988, in a campaign that killed 100,000 civilians and destroyed over 1,200 villages. From April to August, the Iraqis used large-scale attacks with mustard gas and nerve gas to drive out the Iranians. During this period, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency continued to assist the Iraqis with battle planning and intelligence gathering. 65,000 Iranians were killed during this campaign, and Iran finally accepted a ceasefire and withdrawal in August in order to prevent further attacks. After the ceasefire, Saddam ordered further chemical attacks against the Kurds in northern Iraq.
U.S. support of Iraq did not abate, but actually increased as Iraq committed its greatest atrocities in 1988. After the gassing of the Kurds in February and March, the U.S. approved exports of dual use items to Iraq at double the previous rate. The Reagan administration blocked a Senate bill that would have cut off loans to Iraq. As noted previously, the U.S. also took a more active role in the war against Iran, attacking oil rigs and ships.
Stunningly, the U.S. government showed little discretion in exporting chemical and biological weapons materials to Iraq in the last years of the war. According to Center for Disease Control records released in 1995, strains of anthrax, botulinum toxin, and gas gangrene bacteria were exported to Iraq in May 1986. All of these materials were later admitted by Iraq to have been used to make biological weapons. In April 1988, the Department of Commerce approved the export to Iraq of chemicals used to manufacture mustard gas. In December, Dow Chemical sold $1.5 million in pesticides that would be used for chemical weapons.
At the close of the war, the United States was Iraq’s largest supplier of civilian imports, mostly agricultural, in the amount of $700 million in 1987. U.S. companies were also looking to develop Iraqi oil technology and support major public works projects.
Nearly all of Saddam’s greatest crimes were committed during the Iran-Iraq war, yet he continued to receive the unequivocal support of the United States government, which facilitated his crimes with materials, intelligence, and direct military intervention in his favor. Years later, in a turn of black hypocrisy, former members of the Reagan administration would invoke the same crimes they abetted as a justification for turning against their former client. Saddam gassed his own people,
the American public would be told, without hearing that he had received the continued military and economic support of the U.S. after committing this crime. They would also be told that Saddam killed hundreds of thousands of people, without hearing that nearly all of these were in a war in which he was continually supported by the U.S., and at least 165,000 of these died as a result of deliberate U.S. attempts to prolong the war in 1988. Some of Saddam’s enablers, such as Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Cheney, Colin Powell, and George Bush, Sr. would shamelessly preach war against the monster they helped create.
© 2009 Daniel J. Castellano. All rights reserved. http://www.arcaneknowledge.org
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