U.S. Imperialism Backfires in the Caucasus

After fifteen years of American imperial encroachment into Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Russia has finally reasserted itself as a power in the region, as its invasion of Georgia takes advantage of the United States’ preoccupation with the Middle East. The U.S., through NATO, has systematically sought to encircle and break Russia as a world power, and the American lust for global hegemony has succeeded only in reviving Russian nationalism, which could threaten the U.S.’ more vital interests in the Middle East.

The Georgian conflict can only be fully understood in a broader geopolitical context, where the United States, through NATO, has attempted to expand its influence all the way up to the borders of Russia. The American public has a short memory, so their leaders can get away with baldfaced lies, as long as they wait several years. For example, President Clinton, following his predecessor, assured the Russians that NATO would not expand into the former Soviet empire, yet in 1998 Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were admitted, followed by Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 2004, the last three being former Soviet republics. With talk of missile defense systems in Poland and the expansion of NATO into the Ukraine and Georgia, Russia declared its national security was threatened by Western encirclement.

American assurances that NATO expansion is not directed against Russia ring hollow in light of its other false promises. It will be remembered that NATO promised in 1999 to respect Serbian (then Yugoslav) sovereignty over Kosovo, only to completely renege less than a decade later. The Kosovo affair has striking parallels with the Georgia conflict, as it was obvious that the West wanted Kosovo to secede, yet they invaded on the pretext of defending the locals from war crimes, which turn out to have been exaggerated by an order of magnitude. It took extraordinary chutzpah for Western commentators to ridicule Russia’s similar rationalization for invading Kosovo, but fortunately the public has a short memory. Imperialists seek to change facts on the ground through force, and then legitimize these changes after the fact. Imperialist hypocrisy is by no means monopolized by the Russians. The West opposes Russia not on principle, but as rival imperialists. The British Foreign Secretary David Miliband (grandson of a virulently anti-Russian Trotskyite) accuses Russia of having “a nineteenth century approach to politics,” an ironic claim, considering the UK’s participation in the cynical dismemberment of Yugoslavia (in the Bosnian and Kosovo wars), followed by regime changes in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The U.S. clearly tried to play the provocateur in Georgia, as it has been arming and training the Georgian military, which now has rockets and tanks at its disposal to suppress secessionists. A month before the war, over 1,000 U.S. marines were at Vaziani military base, training Georgians in combat maneuvers. Short of a major failure of American intelligence, the U.S. certainly knew of Georgian intentions to invade South Ossetia, but did nothing to prevent it.

Yes, to be clear: Georgia invaded South Ossetia first, not the Russians, contrary to what our beloved “free” press has proclaimed in lockstep. True, there had been shelling of Georgian towns by secessionists, but this had been going on for years, and hardly merited a full invasion. A similar situation has prevailed on Israel’s border with Lebanon. There has always been periodic shelling from militias, so Israel can choose a “retaliatory” invasion any time she pleases. The question, in Georgia’s case, is why President Mikheil Saakasvili chose this particular moment to “retaliate”.

Saakasvili had long promised to restore Georgian rule over the separatist enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which have long enjoyed de facto independence and Russian support. South Ossetia declared its autonomy from Georgia in 1990, a year before Boris Yeltsin dissolved the Soviet Union. In the early 1990s, there was a series of ethnic conflicts in which the Georgians claim as many as 300,000 ethnic Georgians were expelled from the disputed territories. Notwithstanding its support of the separatists, Russia has recognized Georgian sovereignty over South Ossetia and Abkhazia through the UN. Of course, the NATO countries had also recognized Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo, so we know how little that means, as imperialists will seek to change conditions on the ground in order to legitmize political change. The Russians were clearly looking for an excuse to declare the independence of these territories, as shown by their long term military mobilization. Undoubtedly, the recognition of Kosovo’s independence and talk of incorporating Georgia into NATO played a role in Russia’s timing.

As for Saakasvili, he was under pressure to secure Georgia’s borders in order to attain NATO membership, so that may have influenced his timetable. The Georgians and the Americans were certainly aware of the Russian military mobilization, yet the invasion proceeded anyway. They seriously expected Russia to stay out of the conflict, tragically underestimating the Russian will. No longer would Russia meekly step aside as the West determined political outcomes. Yeltsin’s failure in Kosovo led to his replacement by strong nationalists who would rebuild the Russian military, which is much more capable than it was in 1999. More importantly, its economic strength is such that it cannot be cowed by threats of isolation, as we shall see shortly. Finally, the Americans overreached.

On 7 August, hours after declaring a unilateral ceasefire, Saakasvili ordered an attack on South Ossetia in response to escalated shelling of Georgian villages by South Ossetians. Georgia invaded South Ossetia on 8 August, killing hundreds, and burning their capital of Tskhinvali to the ground, including houses, the school and the hospital, according to refugees. Civilians were deliberately targeted, giving justification to Russian accusation of war crimes, though not on the scale of thousands killed that the Russians claimed. The Georgian president declared “Georgian military forces completely control all the territory of South Ossetia” except for the northernmost part.

As we know, the Georgians and the Americans miscalculated terribly, as Russia did retaliate, and more importantly, did not back down in the face of international condemnation. The imperialist bluster of the Americans and their allies was exposed as empty rhetoric. The countries in Russia’s “near abroad” know that American aid offers little protection, as Russian troops easily cut of transportation from Georgia’s ports, and came within 40 miles of the capital Tbilisi. The only alternative to such an invasion would be to roll over and submit to U.S. hegemony. Astoundingly, the Americans seriously expected Russia to do the latter, victims once again of their own hubris, as in Iraq.

Defeating Georgia is not a particularly impressive military achievement, yet Russia’s ability to assert itself in defiance of the West signifies an important shift in Eurasian geopolitics. The Americans certainly dare not engage the Russians militarily, and even their threat of economic warfare no longer holds the potency it once did. Stock price falls due to political panics are short-lived, as 9/11 confirmed. At any rate, support for the South Ossetians is sufficiently strong in Russia that they will not be cowed by a mere threat to their pocketbooks. Russia, with its vast natural gas and oil reserves, its space program, and its role as the world’s leading military supplier, is virtually guaranteed an ascendant role in the global economy. Like China, it is increasingly able to demand pragmatic acceptance even from those ideologically opposed to its political regime. The Russians will demand recognition as a regional power, and the West will ultimately oblige, as they sacrificed principle at the Beijing Games, in order to continue to do business. For businesses are ultimately unpatriotic, and in the long run will seek to undo any punitive sanctions.

Whither Russia? She will not join the WTO, but such membership is probably unnecessary, as dozens of bilateral agreements are already in place to facilitate trade, without subjecting Russia to the retaliatory trade wars that have occurred between the U.S. and Europe through WTO arbitration. Nor will Russia have to abandon state agricultural subsidies – she will retain full autonomy over her economy, while WTO nations have sacrificed legislative independence on the altar of neoliberal economics. Excluding Russia from organizations like the WTO will only enhance her status as a world power, as she is unconstrained by the rules that bind others, who nonetheless will continue to do business with Russia out of necessity.

Russia has sent notice to the U.S. that no longer will the Caucasus be its stomping grounds. The U.S. has overreached in its imperialist ambitions and provoked the resurgence of an assertive Russia. American interest in the Caucasus is marginal and largely economic, but antagonizing Russia may compromise cooperation on more important areas of interest such as Iran. In all cases of course, the U.S. is concerned with economics, as business is the only reason for the empire’s existence – we are much more Carthage than Rome.

Don’t think Obama will put an end to imperialism – he’s already on record as saying he would send forces into Pakistan even without permission, and he would not rule out a nuclear first strike against Iran. How he is less of a jingoist than McCain is anyone’s guess. The Democrats are every bit as ruthless imperialists as the Republicans, as their record in Korea, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia shows. Even Carter gave us the Carter Doctrine, the prerogative to pre-emptively attack anyone who attempts to control the Persian Gulf, as if that region’s oil were American property. The U.S. has painted itself into a corner by overextending, yet it will not relinquish its empire until it is torn away piece by piece.