The medieval concept of free will, human and divine
Daniel J. Castellano
May 16, 1997
Revised August 19, 2006
Intuitively, few things are more obvious than the existence of free
will; intellectually, few things are less obvious. It is this latter
consideration which has led innumerable modern thinkers to replace the
notion of free will with some variant of scientific determinism or an
equally mindless notion of randomness. At the other chronological
extreme are the classical pagan ideologies which are saturated with
ideas of fate, fortune, and predestination. Nestled in between
classical fatalism and modern rationalism lies the medieval idea of
free will, both as a Church doctrine and as a philosophical
concept. The defenders of this doctrine faced the additional
difficulty of rationalizing it within the context of Christian
theology. Reconciling the freedom of human will with the existence of
an omnipotent, omniscient Deity is no small task; for the sake of
coherence, only the works of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas
will be considered. Though their conclusions are similar, their
methods are disparate, reflecting a shift in style engendered by the
incorporation of Aristotelianism into Christian thought.
In St. Augustine's time, only the Platonic dialogues were available
to Western readers; the Aristotelian texts would be received
indirectly centuries later, after they were translated from Arabic. As
such, St. Augustine was severely hampered by the limits of his
sources, and was forced to draw upon his own brilliant insight in
order to rise above historical constraints.
In his City of God, he tackles many difficult questions
regarding the theological inplications of free will; in doing so, he
introduces several important concepts:
Evil men do many things contrary to the will of God; but so great is
his wisdom, and so great his power, that all things which seem to
oppose his will tend toward those ends which he himself has foreknown
as good and just.1
Aside from establishing wisdom and power as defining characteristics
of God (important in discussing Aquinas), Augustine introduces the
idea of predestination as being a foreknowledge, rather than a direct
cause. This distinction is crucial to many of his other arguments, and
eliminates the necessity for belief in astrology and other fatalistic
notions still prevalent in Augustine's time. Moreover, this concept is
useful in resolving many apparent contradictions:
For this reason, when God is said to `change his will', as, for
example, when `he becomes angry' with these people to whom `he was
lenient', it is the people who change, rather than God; and they find
him, in a sense, `changed' in their experience.2
This is essentially a summary of God's twofold immutability; of nature
and of will. This attribute of God brings about further complications
in the relationship between God and man; for, how can man's prayers
affect an unchanging God? The whole dilemma of the effectiveness of
prayer is discussed in the same passage. A distinction is first made
between God's will and the effect of prayer; when God does not effect
the prayers of his saints one may therefore say “God wills it and
does not effect it.”3 God may also
“will what he does not will himself but makes his followers
will...”4 At this point, we must clarify what
Augustine means by “will”. If we take it in every instance to simply mean “desire”,
the preceding statement becomes nonsensical. In fact, Augustine often uses
the word in the sense of bringing an act into existence. We shall see
that using this definition will make subsequent quotations more
Another impediment to the understanding of Augustine's teaching, and
another one of his historical constraints, is the use of temporal
terminology to discuss the atemporal. Augustine was conscious of this;
in his Confessions he observed that, speaking properly, “there
be three times; a present of things past, a present of things present,
and a present of things future.”5 In this transcendent perception of time,
Augustine superimposes unchanging eternity over past, present, and
future, maintaining that his “three times” exist at least in the
mind, in the forms of memory, sight and
expectation.6 This sophisticated understanding
of the atemporal is also evident in his assertion that asking what God
did before the Creation is meaningless, since “time cannot be without
created being...”7 Modern physicists
use a similar argument to defuse criticisms of the `big bang' theory.
If we acknowledge that Augustine did, indeed, have a profound
understanding of the concept of timelessness, the temporal aspects of
words such as foreknowledge and predestination may be
mentally discarded. These ancient ideas, long used in reference to
oracles, fortune-tellers, and pagan deities, have been infused with a
new meaning. Immutability may now be regarded as a consequence of
`It will happen when God wills.' This does not mean that God will then
have a new will which he did not have before; but that something will
then come about which has been prepared from all eternity in his
Here we can see the equivalence of foreknowledge with timelessness, as
well as the temporal overlaid with the eternal. With this well-thought
description of the attributes of God, Augustine has established a set
of theological constraints within which he must incorporate the notion
of human free will.
Most of Augustine's discussion concerning the freedom of will focuses
on explaining the existence of evil. His previous inability to resolve
this question had been a major factor in his attraction to
Manichæism. In City of God, which is more theological than
philosophical in its approach, we are treated to a summary of his
views. In regard to God's creation of free will (with foreknowledge
that his creations would sin), Augustine writes that it is “an act of
greater power and greater goodness to bring good even out of evil than
to exclude the existence of evil,”9 obviously an allusion to Christian
redemption. Endowed with a capacity to change, God's creation, though
initially good, “produced evil for itself by sinning.” The existence
of sin shows the goodness of nature (meant to enjoy God) much as the
blindness of an eye shows the goodness of an eye (for blindness would
not be a defect in a hand or a foot, since sight is not expected of
them).10 In this same work, Augustine
gives a negative definition of evil acts as “a falling away from the
work of God to its own works, rather than any substantive
Furthermore, the choice of will is free only when “not subservient to
fault and sins...”12 Sin, once again, is
negatively defined, this time as man relinquishing his own free
will. The only indication of a positive cause for for the ability to
sin is in his Miltonesque account of how Satan “chose to rejoice over
his subjects rather than be a subject
A more rigorous treatment of the question of evil as it relates to
free will is found in the last of the dialogues following Augustine's
conversion to Christianity (386), The Free Choice of the
Will. The style of argumentation is Socratic-Platonistic; one could easily
imagine Socrates confounding the Sophists in place of Augustine
refuting the Manichees. His companion, Evodius (a Christian), is far
from a mindless foil; he asks provocative and penetrating follow-up
questions which enhance the depth of the discussion. In a reversal of
the Protagoras dialogue, Evodius asks if evil can be
learned. Augustine answers in the negative; since the pursuit of
knowledge is good, its cause is in the sinner: “...evil is nothing
else than to stray from the path of learning.”14 Following this strikingly Platonist remark,
Augustine relates his own past difficulties with the question of
evil,15 and then proceeds,
using various examples, to show how sin can not be defined by outward
acts, since there could always be some mitigating circumstance. It is
passion or desire that makes something a sin.16 Continuing this line of thought, he defines sin
again, this time as the neglect of the eternal for the sake of the
temporal; significantly, he takes care to clarify that evil resides in
the will, rather than the temporal goods
important conclusion here is that free will alone enables man
to sin. Yet if free will is good, is one to say that evil arose from
good? Precisely this question evoked a conflict with Manichæism.
Christianity did not exist in an intellectual void; had Augustine made
no attempt to provide a rational basis for the Catholic faith, there
was no lack of enemies who were eager to debunk it. Though one may
debate the relative virtues of theological or philosophical arguments,
their existence, at least, is necessary to lend credibility to
existing bodies of doctrine, as well as to remove ambiguities. This
latter function was especially important, as it provided an effective
means of distinguishing orthodox Christians from “heretics”
(literally, in Greek, “choosers”). The Manichees had used
Christianity's paradoxes regarding the existence of evil to buttress
their claims that the principles of Good and Evil must have been
distinct from the beginning. Augustine, a former Manichee, was
naturally concerned with this issue.
He begins his justification of God's creation of free will by stating
that free will is also necessary to do good deeds, and that the
possibility of sin is not the purpose of free will, hence God justly
punishes sin.18 The matter
might have rested here, were it not for Evodius' proposal: “While I
accept all of this with firm faith, yet, since I have no intellectual
grasp of it, let us so conduct our inquiry as if it were all
uncertain.”19 In moving
beyond this point, Augustine assumes the role of a philosopher rather
than a theologian, a distinction that would not be fully developed
until the thirteenth century. Citing Biblical verses showing how
belief is necessary for understanding,20 he proceeds painstakingly to
demonstrate that without free will man could not live
rightly.21 Having shown free will to
be good and necessary, Augustine restates his negative definition of
sin, leaving Evodius unconvinced.22
Evodius still sees a contradiction between God foreknowing sin and
sin being a product of free will.23 To quell this discontent, Augustine
employs his special definition of foreknowledge to show that God's foreknowledge does not destroy free will but presupposes it, since
God foresees man having a will which is truly his own, by virtue of
being in his power.24 To
illustrate the point, he explains that if Evodius had foreknowledge of
another man's sin, that sin would certainly happen, but Evodius is not
to be held responsible.25 In this fashion, Augustine completes his most powerful polemic
against the Manichees and an invaluable contribution to the Christian
doctrine of free will.
Ironically, in attacking one heresy, Augustine lent credence to another. His affirmations regarding the necessity of free
will in relation to sin and good deeds were used by the Pelagians to
defend their theory that human will was sufficient to earn
salvation. Augustine was therefore compelled to redress his apparent
neglect of divine grace, and he attempted to do so in a way that
imposed no further constraint on his definition of free will, which,
so far, seems to be in agreement with most intuitive notions of the
concept, making it an extremely powerful doctrine which could resonate
with any man.
Returning to his theological style in Grace and Free Will,
Augustine systematically denounces the Pelagian viewpoint, attesting
that “...God's grace is not given according to our
merits.”26 Without grace, man falls; hence, the beginning of
goodness and virtue ought to be ascribed to God.27 Grace, in Augustine's view, is available to all; one uses free
will to receive it. In this way, good merits come from God, though,
once received, they pertain to the bearer.28 This last part would justify the Church in ascribing
virtues to its saints without contradicting its own doctrine on the
necessity of the grace of God, to which the Church owed its
existence. Augustine then continues with a stronger claim that attacks
the heart of Pelagianism. He defines God's grace as “neither the
knowledge of God's law nor the mere remission of sin, but that grace
which makes it possible to fulfill the Law so that our own nature is
set free from the dominion of sin.”29 [Emphasis added.] With this clarification, Augustine intends to undercut the
Pelagian doctrine by showing that the Pelagians, purportedly
defenders of free will, undermine human freedom by denying the grace
which is necessary for man to be free. Augustine leaves us with this
final contribution, the distinction between free will in general and
the “true” freedom, the freedom from sin. In this way he is able to
coherently maintain that grace does not deny free will, but makes
possible good will where there was evil.30
The eight centuries between St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas
were anything but stagnant. The Germanic conquerors of Rome would be
Christianized, and Christian culture would receive Germanic
influences. The Roman Church split with the Greek, and all of
Christendom would be menaced by the expanding Islamic empire. The
Muslims were threatening not only militarily but
culturally. They reintroduced Aristotelian ideas to Europe, providing
new fuel for heretical movements.
To say that the contribution of St. Thomas Aquinas to Western thought was his
application of Aristotelianism to medieval Christianity would not do
him justice; his appeal has outlasted both that of Aristotle and the
medieval era. In fact, he was less appreciated in his own time, as
many of his points were considered heretical. He rejected
philosophical teachings of fellow Christians, such as the
“ontological” arguments (as Kant later referred to them) of St.
Anselm, who postulated that the very idea of God itself implied God's
existence.31 Aquinas retained, however, the premodern
notion of causality, which was formalized by Aristotle in the
following manner. To the question, “Why does this table exist?” one
may respond in four ways: “Because it is wood” (material); “Because
it has the form of a table” (formal); “Because a carpenter made it”
(efficient); “Because he produced it in order to put things on top of
it” (final). Modern men (save those knowledgeable in philosophy) only
recognize the efficient notion of causality; in the classical and
medieval mind, these were all considered valid types of real
causes.32 Aquinas, however, was careful
not to conflate the different notions of causality, and that is
largely accreditable to his careful attention to the text of Aristotle.
St. Thomas' deviations from Aristotle were usually in the realm of
theology. While agreeing, for example, that God is “pure actuality”
(energeia in Greek), he distanced himself from Aristotle's
handling of objects in kinesis ('movement' toward
actuality).33 Aristotle reasoned that God
could not be free from kinesis if he thought about objects in
kinesis, thereby eliminating the possibility of divine
providence, since the immutable Aristotelian God is necessarily oblivious of the world. St.
Thomas, in contrast, would argue that God's eternal self-knowledge included transcendent knowledge of his creation.34 Thus, Aquinas avoided a wholesale assimilation of Aristotelianism, yet the
influence of “the Philosopher” (as Aquinas referred to Aristotle)
was nonetheless profound.
Although St. Augustine had some knowledge of Platonic “substances”
and “forms” (as indicated, for example, by his argument that memory,
understanding and will are of one substance, one mind35), it is only in Aquinas that we first
see a thorough Aristotelian understanding of these concepts. This
permeates much of Aquinas' work, but is especially explicit in his
commentaries on Aristotle's De Anima. In his enquiry into the
essence of a human soul, the Greek philosopher observes that the soul
“is substance as definable form,”36 as opposed
to substance as matter. Aristotelian form, simply stated, are those
immaterial qualities that make something what it is (e.g. shape,
function, etc.). Observing that physical bodies (and living bodies)
are substances, Aquinas infers that Aristotle defines the soul as a
form that characterizes “a physical body potentially
alive.”37 In this
framework, questions such as whether the soul and body are one become
precluding any sort of dualism or monism. With this definition of the soul,
Aristotle inquires as to its “motive forces,” of which he concludes
there are two, “mind and appetency.” “Mind” is subdivided into
intellect and imagination, the latter occuring only in combination
with appetition.39 Finally, we arrive at the Aristotelian teaching
Now reason does not appear to cause movement apart from appetency; for
will is an appetency. When there is movement by reason there is also
movement by will.40 [Italics added.]
So all of the mind's activity is linked to appetition, including the
intellectual, entailing an absolute freedom of will. One should note,
moreover, that intellect is considered
infallible;41 mistakes only occur as a
result of the “pushing and pulling” of motive
forces.42 This is a Platonist line of
thinking, which Aquinas explicates: “If we act amiss it is...because
we fall short of what we intellectually know.”43 Every object man pursues “is either a
real good or a seeming good.”44
Aristotle felt compelled to explain everything in terms of movement;
this resulted in a small dilemma. While asserting that “an animal is
self-moving inasmuch as it is appetitive,” he also links appetition
to imagination (which can be rational or
remains unclear how imagination can bring about self-movement if the
“cognitive faculty...does not move.”46 As Aquinas illustrates, this is
resolved by noticing that the particular rather than universal
conception causes movement. As his example, “children ought to
honour their parents,” is a universal concept, and cannot cause
movement. “I am a son and I ought here and now to honour my
parents,” is a “particularized” version of the universal concept,
and this is what prompts action.47 This is not an argument for moral relativism or against universals, but an assertion that only the application of universals to concrete circumstances can prompt an act of will.
Aquinas' concept of “particularization” could
be used to explain why Christians sin:
“...one's good judgment as to what should be done in the particular is
neutralised by a pleasure or motion of some kind; one's universal
opinion remaining however, unaltered.”48
Here we have an implicit rationalization of the relevant Church
doctrines regarding temptation, sin, repentance, and reconciliation.
The need to provide rational justification for Church doctrines is
more evident in the Summa contra Gentiles, where Aquinas'
imagined audience consists of the Muslims and their sympathizers. If
St. Thomas could be said to have an archrival, as Augustine did in
Pelagius, it would be the Arabian philosopher Avicenna. Since he saw
himself engaged in a philosophical struggle, Aquinas took pains to
distinguish the roles of philosopher and theologian, a precursor to
the sort of specialization that would redefine Western
science. Succinctly stated, a philosopher, according to Aquinas, views
things “as they are,” while the theologian considers their relation
to God.49 Furthermore, just as philosophy uses the
natural sciences to support its arguments, so theology may employ
human philosophy, arguing from the first cause,
In deducing God from less fundamental, but more intuitive, principles,
Aquinas establishes himself as a philosopher, and retains that role in
his discussion of God's nature. As in Augustine, power and wisdom
are God's defining characteristics. In fact, “God's power is his very
substance.”51 Divine power is
defined with respect to God's actions, of which all creation is an
effect. Additionally, “intellect and will are in
God.”52 God's active power
extends “to everything not repugnant to the notion of that which is
being an act, namely to everything except that which implies a
contradiction.”53 Instead of
regarding logic as an external constraint on God, Aquinas considers logical consistency as being built into the notion
of action, perfect action being the substance of God. This is an
important construction, necessary to discredit “those who assert that
things proceed from God, not by the divine will, but by natural
In defending the Christian doctrine of divine omnipotence, Aquinas
clarifies that God is omnipotent in the sense of “active potency,” not
Basically, he reasons that God cannot do those things which would
cause him to be antithetical to himself; the limitation is
existential, rather than extrinsic. In another work, Aquinas says
that divine power extends to “all things that are possible in
The doctrine of immutability is reasserted in a manner similar to
Augustine;57 in his Quæstiones Disputat
Dei, he attempts to reconcile this doctrine with that of divine free
will: “Though God is unchangeable, his will is not confined to one
issue as regards things to be done: hence he has free
As the Summa contra Gentiles is directed in large part toward
the Muslim sages, Aquinas is emphatic in his refutation of the second
half of this “double error”: “that God can do only that which He
does because He is bound to this; and the error of those who assert
that all things follow from the will of God.”59 The
treatment of this “error” touches many aspects of Christian
cosmology, and it will dominate the remainder of this discussion.
The first question that arises is whether things are good in
themselves or good because of God; essentially a recasting of the
Augustinian theory of grace. Following Aristotle's thinking, Aquinas
sees an “appetite for the good” in all things; inanimate objects
have a natural appetite (in modern speech, the laws of physics); lower
animals have only an animal appetite, whereas humans also have an
intellectual or rational appetite, known as the
will.60 The idea that things
are good in themselves is also supported in the Summa
Theologiæ by the following syllogism:
Sed contra est quod omnia sunt bona inquantum sunt. Sed non dicantur
omnia entia per esse divinum sed per esse proprium. Ergo non omnia
sunt bona bonitate divina sed bonitate propria.61
However, God acts as a source of goodness in a Platonic sense, acting
as “primo principio exemplari, effectivo et finali totius
bonitatis.”62 In this manner, Aquinas hopes to have eluded
As St. Augustine did in The Free Choice of Will, Aquinas
appears to have asserted the independence of creation a bit too
strongly. He addresses this potential criticism in the
Quæstiones, explaining how “God works in both nature and
will...as a man causes the knife's cutting by the very fact that he
applies the sharpness of the knife.”63 The sharpness
of the knife is nonetheless necessary for the cutting; in this way,
Aquinas refutes the Moorish sages in their claim “that fire does not
heat but God creates heat” whenever an object is placed near
fire.64 Aquinas' universe is neither
self-winding nor inert. By postulating God as the sole cause of being,
the Angelic Doctor renders it impossible for a created intelligence to
give being except when acting as “an instrument of the divine power
operating.”65 In sum, by “upholding
their being...[God] acts in every agent immediately, without prejudice
to the action of the will and of nature.”66 This is intended as a direct denial of Avicenna's doctrine of
a separate agent intellect.
Lastly, we re-encounter the perennial Christian conundrum revolving
around God's responsibility for man's sin. Here, once again,
Aristotle's presence is felt, as Aquinas holds that “every
intellectual substance is incorruptible,” and that “all corruption
occurs through the separation of form from matter.”67 God would be capable
of sinning were he able to will to sin; since the latter is
precluded by divine wisdom, God cannot sin.68 As for the sins of
men, the responsibility is divided as follows. The “entity and
actuality” of the sinful act has God as its cause, but “the
deformity of sin” is attributable to the sinner; by analogy, the
“movement of limping comes from the power to walk, whereas the defect
is owing to the misshapen leg.”69
St. Thomas follows Augustine in regarding evil as a privation, yet he attributes a positive existence to sinful acts, while his use of Aristotelian metaphysics enables him to analyze sin in a way that
places all blame on the sinner. In this vein, he adds that God may
“incline man's will to evil” only “by permitting and directing the
evil.”70 Characteristically meticulous,
Aquinas also accounts for the good deeds that God does not do,
maintaining that the Creator “does not omit them, since he is not
bound to do them, which is a necessary condition of
On this note, we conclude our discussion, having found the single most
important aspect of the Christian doctrine of free will to be man's
responsibility for his own sins. From St. Augustine's notion of free
will evidenced by external consciousness,72 we
have arrived at Aquinas' conception of man's will as having “dominion
over its act”; in both cases, free will acts “not to the exclusion
of the first cause.” 73 The presence of the divine will created many problems
for the Christian theologians and philosophers, difficulties which
were exploited by their non-Catholic adversaries who wished to either
enhance or diminish the role of the divine will. A “middle road” was
chosen by both Augustine and Aquinas, a path which asserted a strong
omnipresent Deity while emphasizing man's responsibility for his sin
and consequent need for repentance. While Augustine made this argument
in a largely theological context, Aquinas found himself in an entirely
different set of historical circumstances, necessitating a more
philosophical approach, while upholding the truth of the same
religious doctrine defended by his predecessor.
- Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo,
City of God (London: Penguin Books, 1972), p.1023. Bk.XXII,
- Ibid., p.1024.
- Loc. cit.
- Saint Augustine, Bishop of
Hippo, The Confessions of St. Augustine, Edward B. Pusey,
trans. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1961),
- Loc. cit.
- Ibid., p.205.
- Augustine, City of God, op. cit.,
p.1022. Bk.XXII, Ch.1.
- Ibid., pp.1022-3.
- Ibid., p.568. Bk.XIV, Ch.11. Augustine uses
creation ex nihilo to show that creations, made out of nothing,
rather than of God's substance, have this capacity of their own
volition rather than on account of a flaw in God's substance.
- Ibid., p.569.
- Loc. cit.
Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, The Free Choice of the Will, from
The Fathers of the Church, Edward B. Pusey, trans., LIX
(Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1968),
pp.73-4. Bk.I, Ch.1.
- Ibid., p.75. Bk.I, Ch.2.
pp.77-8. Bk.I, Ch.3.
- Ibid., pp.105-6. Bk.I, Chs.15-6.
- Ibid., p.109. Bk.II, Ch.1.
- Ibid., p.111. Bk.II, Ch.2.
pp.112-3. Isa.7:9, John 17:3, Matt.7:7.
- Ibid., pp.158-9. Bk.II, Ch.18.
pp.162-3. Bk.II, Ch.20.
p.168. Bk.III, Ch.2.
- Ibid., p.173. Bk.III, Ch.3.
- Ibid., pp.174-5. Bk.III,
- Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, Grace and
Free Will, from The Fathers of the Church, op. cit.,
- José Gaos, Historia de nuestra idea del
mundo (Mexico: El Colegio de México, Fondo de Cultura
Económica, 1992), p.43.
- Ibid., p.41.
- W.K.C. Guthrie, The Greek Philosophers
(New York: Harper & Row, 1975), p.138.
- Ibid., p.139.
Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, The Trinity, from Augustine:
Lost Works, John Baillie et. al., eds. (Philadelphia: Westminster
Press, 1955), pp.87-8. Bk.X.
- Aristotle, De
anima, version of William of Moorbeke, with commentary of Saint
Thomas Aquinas; Kenelm Foster and Silvester Humphries, trans. (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), p.173. Bk.II, Ch.II.
- Ibid., p.169. Bk.II, Ch.I. Aquinas.
- Ibid., p.164. Bk.II, Ch.II. Aristotle.
- Ibid., p.468. Bk.II,
- Ibid., pp.468-9.
- Ibid., p.469.
- Ibid., p.470.
p.473. Bk.III, Ch.X. Aquinas.
- Loc. cit.
- Ibid., p.477. Bk.III, Ch.X. Aristotle.
p.478. Bk.III, Ch.XI. Aristotle.
pp.481-2. Bk.III, Ch.XI. Aquinas.
- Loc. cit.
- Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles,
James F. Anderson, trans., II (Garden City, N.Y.: Hanover House,
1956), p.34. Ch.4, §1.
- Ibid., p.35. Ch.4, §4.
- Ibid., p.36. Ch.8, §1.
- Ibid., p.41. Ch.10, §1.
- Ibid., p.66. Ch.22, §4.
- Ibid., p.33. Ch.3, §4.
- Ibid., p.73. Ch.25, §2.
- Saint Thomas Aquinas, Quæstiones
Disputatæde Potentia Dei, English Dominican Fathers, trans.
(Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1952.), Bk.I, p.40. Q.I, Art.VI.
- Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, op. cit.,
p.76. Ch.25, §23.
- Aquinas, Quæstiones, op. cit., p.33. Q.I,
Summa contra Gentiles, op. cit., p.85. Ch.29, §20.
- Ibid., p.142. Ch.47, §2.
- Saint Thomas
Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, Vol.2, Ia. 2-11, Timothy McDermott,
ed. (London: Blackfriars, 1964), p.90. Ia. 6, 4. “On the other hand
things are good inasmuch as they exist. Now things are said to exist,
not by divine existence, but by their own. So things are good, not by
God's goodness, but by their own.”
- Ibid., p.92. “the pattern, source and
goal of all goodness.”
Quæstiones, op. cit., pp.130-1. Q.III, Art.VII.
- Ibid., p.128.
- Ibid., p.132.
Summa contra Gentiles, op. cit., p.158.
Quæstiones, op. cit., p.36. Q.I, Art.VI.
- Ibid., p.37.
- Loc. cit.
- Ibid., p.38.
The Free Choice of the Will, op. cit., p.171. Bk.3, Ch.3.
- Aquinas, Quæstiones, op.
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